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INTRODUCTION 
While the courts continue to debate the limits of inherent executive power under the 
Federal Constitution, the past several years have taught us important lessons about how 
and to what extent constitutional and sub-constitutional constraints may effectively 
check the broadest assertions of executive power. Following the publication in 2004 of 
photographs of U.S. troops torturing captives at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq, executive branch use of torture and other forms of coercive interrogation has 
raised profound questions of policy and morality. Are such tactics useful in combating 
the terrorist threat? Is a government ever morally justified in using such techniques? 
What are the negative consequences for U.S. strategic security goals from the public 
exposure of such practices? The practice has also raised serious questions of law 
regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. constitutional and treaty obligations, 
the scope of the ban on "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" under U.S. law, 1 and 
* Visiting Scholar, Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University; Director, U.S. Law and Security Program, Human Rights First. A.B., 1993 
Cornell University; J.D., 1998 Harvard Law School; Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1999-2000. Special thanks to Allison Johnson, Avi Cover, Hina Shamsi, Ken 
Hurwitz, Priti Patel, Josh Kretman, and Lauren Smith for past and present research assistance 
and ongoing hard work. I also extend thanks to the extraordinary military leaders I have had the 
privilege to meet and learn from in the past several years, particularly Adm. John D. Hutson 
(USN-Ret.), Gen. James Cullen (USA-Ret.), and Gen. David R. Irvine (USA-Ret.). These 
individuals and many others engaged in these issues in and outside of the Pentagon have been 
an invaluable source of insight and inspiration; they have my admiration and respect. 
1. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by resolution of the 
U.N. General Assembly Dec. 19, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1984); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
136 CONG. REC. Sl7486 (1990) (U.S. Senate reservations declaring "[t]hat the United States 
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the adequacy of enforcement mechanisms to hold accountable those who violate such 
prohibitions. 
Perhaps above all, the practice has raised hard questions about what remains of 
meaningful constraints on executive power. The conduct revealed in the Abu Ghraib 
photos was immediately and widely condemned by political leaders on both sides of 
the aisle. 2 In the intense scrutiny of executive branch practice that followed, it became 
clear that the executive had not only contemplated the use of coercion up to and 
including torture, but that, arguably at least, the torture and abuse documented in an 
ever-widening series of incidents from Afghanistan to Iraq to the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay was the result of a combination of direct executive authorization, and 
executive knowledge of wrongdoing coupled with a failure to correct and punish.3 
Further, executive conduct in this realm was justified, at least for a time, by a 
sweepingly broad assertion of presidential power according to which the federal law 
criminalizing torture could be found unconstitutional if interpreted to constrain the 
ability of the President as commander in chief to authorize coercive interrogation.4 
Whatever the theoretical merits of coercive interrogation as applied in a targeted 
way against the most heinous of suspects, the widespread torture and abuse of scores of 
apparently innocent detainees was an outcome no one purported to seek. Yet there are 
now hundreds of officially documented incidents of torture and abuse in U.S. custody 
since 2002, only a fraction of which occurred at Abu Ghraib. Among the most 
troubling statistics is the Pentagon's documentation of more than two dozen homicides 
in U.S. detention facilities worldwide since 2002 (only one of which was at Abu 
Ghraib), including at least eight individuals who were tortured to death.5 Whether or 
considers itself bound by the obligation under article 16 to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment', only insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment' means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the 
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."); see 
also Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Publ. L. No. 109-148 § 1001, 119 Stat. 2739 (McCain 
Amendment banning cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment). 
2. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the conduct "unacceptable" and "un-
American." Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Department Operational Update Briefing (May 4, 2004), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040504-secdefl 423 .html. Republican Senator 
John McCain emphasized that "history shows-and I know a little bit about this-that 
mistreatment of prisoners and torture is not productive .... You don't get information that's 
usable from people under torture, because they just tell you what you want to hear." Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Prisoner Abuse Scandal Puts McCain in Spotlight Once Again, N. Y. TrMEs, May 10, 
2004, at Al 9. Republican Senator John Warner agreed, noting that the abuses, if true, were "an 
appalling and totally unacceptable breach of military conduct that could undermine much of the 
courageous work and sacrifice by our forces in the war on terror." John Warner, Statement on 
Iraqi P.O.W. Mistreatment (May 3, 2004), http://www.senate.gov/-warner/pressoffice 
/pressreleases/20040503 .htm. 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gneral, Office of Legal Counsel, 
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com /wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo2002080 l .pdf. [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. 
5. See HUMAN RIGHJ'S FIRST, COMMAND'S REsPONSIBil..ITY: DETAINEE DEATHS IN U.S. 
CUSTODY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info 
/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf; Prisoner Deaths in U.S. Custody, Assoc. PREss, Mar. 16, 
2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=ln/a/2005/03/16/national 
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not one believes that the executive bears direct political or legal responsibility for this 
conduct,6 few dispute that the most egregious of these acts are unlawful, and that the 
consequences of their revelation for U.S. policy have been overwhelmingly adverse.7 
How is it, then, that the structures of our constitutional democracy, theoretically 
designed to avoid outcomes in which the power of the executive branch is exercised 
over a period of time without check in a manifestly unlawful way, failed to do so in this 
case? Our Constitution and laws are replete with basic affirmative human rights; the 
structural separation of powers among the branches is also designed to protect 
individual rights; and, particularly since World War II, executive power to act in the 
realm of national security has been constrained by a rich canon of statutes and 
regulations. Were none of these tools sufficient? What lessons can we take from the 
example of torture for the prospects of effectively constraining executive national 
security power going forward? 
This Article suggests some answers to each of these questions. Following a 
discussion of why torture and abuse in the "war on terror" became such a pervasive 
problem in the years after September 11, this Article argues that the most effective 
power-checking tools (at least at the margins) have emerged from less classically 
"democratic" sources: a highly professionalized military and intelligence community; 
the media and the organizations of non-governmental civil society; and the active 
engagement of the courts. While it is true that many of our core democratic structures 
failed to constrain executive operations in prisoner detention and treatment 
(particularly Congress, charged as a co-equal partner in U.S. national security and 
foreign affairs powers),8 these other levers have seen at least modest success in 
changing the course of executive policy. Indeed, this Article suggests that effective 
constraints on executive power going forward are more likely to be found in the 
reinforcement and enhancement of the courts and these other arguably undemocratic 
institutions, than through congressional or other "hardcore" democratic checks on 
power. 
I. EXECUTIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND TORTURE 
Any discussion of lessons learned from recent U.S. experiences with torture and 
coercive interrogation must begin with a clear-eyed view of what those experiences 
include, namely, a startling record of widespread torture and abuse. Most well known 
among these incidents are the acts depicted in photographs from the U.S.-run Abu 
/wl 13007S95.DTL; George Gedda, Official Report Substantiates 190 Instances of Prisoner 
Abuse, Defends U.S. Response, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/13490.html. 
6. Regarding the legality of interrogation methods, see infra note 52. 
7. Concern about the negative effects of such practices on U.S. national security policy has 
also been bipartisan in nature. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Coalition 
Operations, Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing (May 10, 2004), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr200405 l0-0742.htrnl; see also John Hendren and 
Elizabeth Shogren, Shooting Spurs Iraqi Uproar, U.S. Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, 
available at http://198.62.75. l/wwwl/news/lat-l l-l 7-04b.html. 
8. Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169 (2006). 
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Ghraib prison in Iraq, showing U.S. troops subjecting prisoners to mock execution, 
sexual humiliation, beatings, and numerous other forms of degrading treatment.9 
Yet the torture and cruel treatment of detainees in U.S. custody predated, and has 
postdated, the events at Abu Ghraib. According to Department of Defense documents, 
since 2002, at least thirty-four detainees held in connection with the U.S. "global war 
on terror" 10 have died as a result of homicide while in U.S. custody; at least eight of 
these men were tortured to death.11 Of these deaths, only one occurred at the U.S. 
detention facility at Abu Ghraib. 12 As of November 2005, the Army alone has 
investigated more than 600 allegations of detainee mistreatment, and more than 230 
soldiers and officers have faced courts-martial, non-judicial punishments, and 
administrative punishments for torture and other acts of abuse. 13 As one of the many 
Pentagon investigations conducted into the issue concluded in 2004, the problem has 
been systemic in nature. 14 
9. Guardian Unlimited, Gallery, May 2004: The Images That Shamed America, 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/gall/0,8542, 1211872,00.html. 
10. The Administration' s term "global war on terror" is meant to describe U.S. government 
operations to target terrorist organizations "of global reach," and includes military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and detention and intelligence operations worldwide since 2001. See, e.g, 
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 129 
(Jan. 29, 2002) ("Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror .... 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace 
of the world."); President George Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; Press Release, The Coalition Information Centers, The 
Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days (Dec. 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/ZOO 1/12/ l OOdayreport. pdf. 
11. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 5; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2000) 
('"[T]orture' means an act committed by a person acting under the color of Jaw specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering ( other than pain or suffering 
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control."). 
12. Since 2002, the United States has maintained on the order of six main detention 
facilities worldwide (three in Iraq, two in Afghanistan, and one in Guantanamo Bay) and 
approximately twenty-five transient facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq in connection with its 
operations in the "global war on terror." HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BEIDND THE WIRE: AN UPDATE 
TO ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 1-2 (2005), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law 
/PDF/behind-the-wire-033005.pdf; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al (describing secret detention facilities operated by the United 
States in Europe and Southeast Asia). Among publicly known detention facilities, the newest is 
set to open in northern Iraq by the end of 2005. See Elaine Eliah, Team Quickly Tums Old Fort 
into Detention Facility, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Oct. 21, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Oct2005/2005 l 021_3122.html. 
13. Josh White, 5 Soldiers Charged with Abuse of Detainees, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at 
Al2. 
14. MAJ . GEN. GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION 
FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 8 (2004), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter FAY REPORT] (marked 
unclassified, with sections redacted) (finding that "leader responsibility and command 
responsibility, systemic problems and issues also contributed to the volatile environment in 
which the abuse occurred"). 
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On the critical questions how and why torture and abuse became so widespread, a 
collection of Pentagon investigations and leaked documents on post-September 11 U.S. 
detention and interrogation operations now help point to a set of explanations:15 vague 
or unlawful executive guidance; inaction by civilian executive authority in the face of a 
broadly apparent problem of unlawful activity; and badly underdeveloped resources, 
training, and planning for detention and interrogation operations. In an effort to help 
identify where executive power failed-and what constraints on power may have been 
lacking-this Part briefly canvasses the role each of these factors appears to have 
played. 
A. Vague or Unlawful Guidance 
Central to understanding the high incidence of torture and abuse in U.S. detention 
facilities since 2002 is the broad policy guidance from executive authorities as to what 
rules apply in such operations. This guidance, coupled with direct orders authorizing 
certain interrogation techniques that appear to violate the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, resulted in two significant problems. 
15 . See VICE ADM. ALBERT T. CHURCH, REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
INTERROGATION OPERATIONS (2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d200503 l 0 
exe. pdf [hereinafter CHURCH REPORT]; LT. GEN. ANTHONY R. JONES, AR. 15-6 lNvEsnGA TION OF 
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 6-33 (2004), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter JONES 
REPORT] (marked unclassified); LT. GEN. PAUL T. MIKOLASHEK, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION (2004) [hereinafter DAIG REPORT] (unmarked, unclassified); 
MAJ. GEN. GEOFFREY MILLER, ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND 
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs 
/AbuGhraib/Abu3.pdf [hereinafter MILLER REPORT]; MAJ. GEN. DONALD J. RYDER, REPORT ON 
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS IN IRAQ 9-12 (2004), available at 
http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (marked secret); JAMES R. SCHI.ESINGER, 
FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD 
DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm 
?id=l0157 (scroll down and download full text version) [hereinafter SCHI.ESINGER REPORT] 
( unmarked, unclassified); LT. GEN. MARK SCHMIDT & BRIG. GEN. JOHN FuRLow' INVESTIGATION 
INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 
(2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/detainees/schmidt-army-reg-
150605.pdf [hereinafter SCHMIDT REPORT]; MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004), available at 
http://www.npr.org/ iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report. pdf [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT] (marked 
secret); FAY REPORT, supra note 14; Brig. Gen. Richard P. Formica, Commander lli Corps 
Artillery, Report on Allegations of Abuse by Special Operations Forces in Iraq (Dec. 2004) 
(never made public) (on file with Human Rights First); Brig. Gen. Charles H. Jacoby, 
Investigation on U.S.-run Detention Facilities in Afghanistan (July 2004) (never made public) 
(on file with Human Rights First). Despite the many investigations conducted to date, the 
official inquiry into what happened and why-particularly the role of the CIA and Special 
Forces in these events, as well as the role of command authority-remains fundamentally 
incomplete. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GETTING TO GROUND TRUTH 14-22 (2004), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/ detainees 
/Getting_to _ Ground_ Truth_ 090804. pdf. I 
I 
I 
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First, broad policy decisions changed what had been for decades settled U.S. law-
embodied in military doctrine, field manuals, and training-that detention operations in 
a "war" context were invariably controlled by the set of Geneva Conventions 
governing the treatment of both captured foreign troops and all those caught up in the 
course of armed conflict. These conventions together afford all such individuals a right 
to basic humane treatment-whether or not they are also entitled to the special status of 
"prisoner of war."16 In its place, as discussed below, the administration offered no 
comprehensive or consistent policy understanding of what rules did apply. According 
to post hoc Pentagon investigations, this left military and intelligence officials 
confused, at the least, as to how to instruct or correct those under their command. 
Second, compounding this confusion, senior military command officials 
promulgated a harsh and rapidly shifting set of field orders in an attempt to implement 
the new policy regime--orders that, among other things, lifted restrictions on certain 
interrogation techniques that had been previously out-of-bounds. Although troops and 
command moved seamlessly from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay to Iraq ( as a result 
of transfers and shifting troop deployments), the operative detention and interrogation 
orders in each of these theaters differed from each of the others. And the orders 
differed further within each detention center depending on the month, the agency 
affiliation of the interrogator, and the assigned legal status (again, a shifting set of 
designations) of the prisoner himself. These policies and orders, and the confusion they 
engendered, unquestionably played a role in facilitating abuse. 
1. A New Direction in Policy 
In the months following September 11, the White House promulgated guidance that 
the Geneva Conventions-treaties signed and ratified by the United States and 
governing U.S. conduct in circumstances of armed conflict-would not apply to broad 
categories of individuals arrested in the course of the "global war on terror." 17 In 
16. See DEP'TOFTHEARMY, FIEwMANUAL34-52 INTELLIGENCEINTERROGATION (1992), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf [hereinafter FM 34-52); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, 
ARMY REGULATION 190-8 ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN 
INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES (1997), http://www.au.af.miVau/awc/awcgate/law/arl90-
8.pdf. FM 34-52 states that "[t]hese principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used 
within the constraints established by," among other things, the Geneva Convention [I] for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field of 
August 12, 1949; Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 
August 12, 1949; and Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of August 12, 1949. FM 34-52, supra, at iv-v. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the body designated by the Geneva treaties as primarily responsible for treaty 
interpretation, has long held that all those caught up in the course of armed conflict are 
governed by one of the Geneva Conventions--either as lawful combatants under Geneva ill, or 
as civilians (whether engaged unlawfully in combat or not) under Geneva IV. See Int'! Comm. 
of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers (May 
5, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList74/0F32B7E3BB38DD26Cl256 
E8A0055F83E. 
17. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
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particular, in a reversal of more than fifty years of U.S. policy and over the vigorous 
objections of the Secretary of State at the time, the White House concluded that the 
Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, apparently including 
its prohibition of cruel treatment, would not apply to suspected members of al Qaeda. 18 
While the President and Secretary of Defense issued statements in early 2002 that the 
United States would-as a matter of policy (as distinct from legal obligation)-treat 
detainees in a manner "reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions," these 
statements were limited by caveats that treatment would depend on the extent to which 
such treatment was appropriate and consistent with military necessity, and on 
determinations about whether detainees were "unlawful combatants" or "high value 
detainees" or other designations unknown in existing military doctrine. 19 
Later that year, in August 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of 
Justice (OLC) also produced policy guidance on the treatment of detainees in the 
custody of the United States. Most famously, OLC concluded with respect to the use of 
coercive interrogation that for physical pain inflicted by an interrogator to amount to 
torture, the "victim must experience intense pain and suffering of the kind that is 
equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe 
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily 
function will likely result. "20 (Among other things, this definition went into detail well 
beyond the definition in the federal criminal law banning torture, which defined torture 
simply as including any act "specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering."21 ) On the question of presidential authority, OLC lawyers advised, 
inter alia, that the President not only had the authority to order any and all treatment 
falling short of the pain associated with organ failure or death, but also that it would be 
unconstitutional for Congress to pass legislation (including the criminal prohibition of 
acts of torture already in the federal criminal code) that would interfere in this exercise 
ofpower.22 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 7 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II] ; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
18. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House Gen. Counsel, to President George 
W. Bush, Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with 
AI Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek 
( citing Geneva Convention III, supra note 17). The memorandum did not address-and indeed, 
appeared to assume irrelevant-the question whether al Qaeda detainees would be entitled to 
more basic protection against inhumane treatment provided by the fourth Geneva Convention 
governing all others caught up in the scope of armed conflict. See Geneva Convention IV, supra 
note 17. 
19. Secretary Rumsfeld stated that "technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights 
under the Geneva Conventions." Donald Rumsfeld & Gen. Richard B. Myers, Department of 
Defense News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/ 
tO ll l 2002_t0111 sd.html; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 11-12 
(2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/EndingSecretDetentions_web.pdf. 
20. Bybee Memo, supra note 4, (citing 18 U.S.C. §2340 (1998)). 
21. 18 u.s.c. § 2340 (1998). 
22. Bybee Memo, supra note 3 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2340 (1998)). 
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For the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003, the administration adopted a new 
approach. It stated publicly that it would only hold detainees in that conflict under the 
protection of one or the other of the two most relevant Geneva Conventions regarding 
prisoners of war and civilians picked up in the course of armed conflict-presumably 
including their prohibitions of cruel treatment.23 Despite the apparent return to the 
standard Geneva regime for the war in Iraq, additional policy-level judgments worked 
quickly to cloud the picture. 
Established military doctrine implementing the Geneva regime had recognized four 
categories of detainees: enemy prisoners of war, retained personnel, civilian internees, 
and a catch-all "other detainee" category. Without updating that doctrinal guidance, the 
United States began housing thousands of detainees whose non-doctrinal identification 
brought with it indeterminate legal status: enemy combatants, unprivileged enemy 
combatants, security internees, criminal detainees, military intelligence holds, persons 
under U.S. forces control, and low-level enemy combatants.24 Traditional categories 
like "prisoner of war" were used for only a handful of the many thousands the U.S. 
held in custody.25 As command and troops were transferred from Afghanistan to Iraq, 
the shifting set of apparently applicable rules-including what kind of treatment 
attached to what kind of detainee-became increasingly difficult to follow.26 
At the same time, OLC lawyers again worked to recast seemingly clear Geneva 
provisions, this time, for instance, on the question of whether Geneva permitted the 
administration to remove certain detainees from Iraq for interrogation elsewhere.27 
Article 49 of Geneva IV broadly prohibits the removal of "protected persons from 
occupied territory."28 Yet in the months following the publication of the photos from 
Abu Ghraib, it became clear that prisoners had been removed from Iraq, presumably 
for the purpose of interrogating them in a place or under circumstances in which the 
interrogation rules applicable in the Iraqi theater would not seem to apply.29 It also 
23. News Transcript, Dep't of Def., Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPW's and War 
Crimes, (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/ 
t04072003_t407genv.html. For a discussion of the lawfulness of these particular techniques 
under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, see infra note 52. 
24. DAIG REPORT, supra note 15, at 44-47, FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-12. 
25. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19 at 9-17. News Transcript, Dep't of Def., Enemy 
Prisoner of War Briefing from Kuwait City (May 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.defenselink.miUtranscripts/2003/tr20030508-0160.html. 
26. For more on the confusion, see infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
27. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention categorically prohibits theforcible transfer 
or deportation of "protected persons" outside occupied territory. Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 ("Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected 
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other 
country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."). See Memorandum from 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, Re: The Permissibility on Relocating Certain "Protected Persons" from Occupied Iraq 
(Mar. 19, 2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us%5Flaw/etn/gonzales 
/memos_dir/memo_200403 l 9 _Golds_ Gonz.pdf; Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees 
Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al. 
28. Geneva Convention art. 49, supra note 27. 
29. In March 2004, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith wrote a confidential memo 
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eventually became clear that U.S. forces in Iraq were holding prisoners off the rolls-
without recording their identity or existence on official Army records-again a 
violation of Geneva and domestic implementing regulations.30 And, as later became 
painfully apparent, unauthorized and unlawful treatment of detainees was pervasive in 
practice.31 
The administration's equivocal relationship with the Geneva Convention regime-
the only set of rules the military had been trained to follow with respect to prisoner 
detention and interrogation operations32 -left, at the very least, a vacuum in policy 
guidance. Into that vacuum rushed a series of directives that left little doubt that 
interrogators' gloves, in any theater of operations, were meant to come off.33 
2. Implementing Changes in the Field 
Whether or not the broadest statements of administration policy were lawful or 
accurate interpretations of the underlying law (and arguments are vigorous that they 
were not34), there is no question that this guidance found its way into subsequent 
Defense Department directives to frontline forces on what treatment was authorized 
toward detainees in U.S. custody.35 
For example, in November 2002, two months after OLC promulgated its memo 
expansively defining presidential authority, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved the 
use of military dogs to induce fear and to exploit "individual phobias" during the 
to Alberto Gonzales, arguing that the CIA could secretly transfer prisoners out of Iraq, despite 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, supra 
note 27; Priest, supra note 27. 
30. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19 at 7. 
31. See infra, Part 11.C. 
32. See infra, Part III.A. 
33. Cofer Black, Director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center from 1999 until May of 
2002, stated on September 26, 2002 that "All I want to say is that there was 'before' 9/11 and 
'after' 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off." Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Activities Before 
and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence and the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 600--02 (2002) 
(statement of Cofer Black, Former Chief, DCI's Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence 
Agency), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/092602black.pdf. 
34. See e.g., David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425 
(2005); Neil McDonald and Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The 
Third Geneva Convention and the "War on Terror," 44 HARV. INT'LL.J. 301 (2003); Jeremy 
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1681 (2005); Julie Angell, Comment, Ethics, Torture, and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ 
Office of Legal Counsel, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557 (2005). 
35. After the Geneva memos but evidently before the Bybee memo was complete, Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld approved a list of interrogation techniques on Dec. 2, 2002, for use on 
detainees at Guantanamo (most of whom had been detained in connection with hostilities in 
Afghanistan). These December techniques included the use of "stress positions," twenty-hour 
interrogations, the removal of clothing, playing upon a detainee's phobias to induce stress (such 
as through the use of dogs), isolation for up to thirty days, and sensory deprivation. Some of 
these policies were soon withdrawn, at least in part in response to Pentagon lawyers' objections. 
See 151 CONG. REC. 8794-96 (July 25, 2005) (Military JAG Memos on Working Group 
Report), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/pdf/jag-memos-072505.pdf. 
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interrogation of a specific detainee at Guantanamo.36 In December, the directive 
became more aggressive still, including in addition the use of "stress positions," 
twenty-hour interrogations, the removal of clothing, isolation for up to thirty days, and 
sensory deprivation. 37 In addition to promulgating this guidance for use at Guantanamo 
Bay, U.S. Army Central Command (responsible for ongoing operations in Afghanistan) 
told command officers in Afghanistan that "doctrinal approaches" to detainee 
operations were not "tak[ing] full advantage of the various policies adopted by civilian 
leadership to deal with the unique nature of this unconventional operation."38 While the 
primary Pentagon investigation into U.S. detention and interrogation operations in 
Afghanistan has never been released publicly,39 a summary of the official military 
investigation into Guantanamo concluded that a number of the December techniques 
had "migrated" to operations in Afghanistan.40 
It was at this time, late 2002, that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents 
conducting intelligence operations at Guantanamo began complaining to the 
Department of Defense General Counsel's office and others that Guantanamo detainees 
were being subjected to sexual humiliation, threatened by dogs, and left naked, isolated 
36. SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 15, at 14; Josh White, Anny General Advised Using Dogs 
at Abu Ghraib, Officer Testifies, WASH. POST, July 28, 2005, at Al 8. 
37. Memorandum from William J. Haynes, General Counsel to Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. 
Department of Defense, Re: Counter-Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002) (approved by 
Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, with hand-written comment: "However, I stand for 8-10 hours 
a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"). Haynes' memo attaches a memo from General 
James Hill (Oct. 25, 2002); a memo from Maj. Gen. Michael Dunlavey (Oct. 11, 2002), a memo 
(legal review) by LTC Diane Beaver (Oct. 11, 2002) and a Request for Approval for Counter-
Resistance Strategies from LTC Jerald Phifer (Oct. 11, 2002). 
38. An internal military document issued by the U.S. Army Central Command stated: 
"(D]octrinal approaches to 'EPW' or 'Detainee' operations initially utilized by CFLCC 
[Coalition Forces Land Component Command] did not take full advantage of the various 
policies adopted by civilian leadership to deal with the unique nature of this unconventional 
operation. The laws and policies regarding the war against terrorism must be used to the 
maximum extent possible and support flexibility for commanders instead of acting as restrictive 
barriers. The laws permit greater latitude than what is exercised in conventional operations." 
ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report, ch. 3, Operational Intelligence, at 
DODDOA13242, 13243 (no date) (unpublished, partial, and unidentified document, on file with 
Human Rights First). 
39. Lieutenant General David Barno, Commander, Combined Forces Command, 
Afghanistan, announced the planned investigation in June 2004: "I've directed a top-to-bottom 
review of all ofour detention facilities. It will be conducted by Brigadier General Chuck Jacoby, 
who is our deputy commander for support in Bagram there with Combined Joint Task Force 76. 
He's wrapping up that top-to-bottom review now. I'll be getting a report out on where we stand 
today by the end of the month on all of our facilities vice the standards we've set to make sure 
we're in complete compliance with our own standards." See News Transcript, Department of 
Defense, Central Command Briefing (June 17, 2004 ), available at http://www.defenselink.mil 
/transcripts/2004/tr20040617-0882.htrnl. To date, the Jacoby report has not been made public. 
Human Rights First filed a FOIA request for the Jacoby report in June 2004; as of November 
2005, the Defense Department was still reviewing the request. Request from Human Rights First 
to Defense Department (June 2004) (request on file with Human Rights First). 
40. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 6. 
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in frigid temperatures without access to bathrooms.41 Between January 2002, when 
detainees first began arriving at Guantanamo Bay, and September 2003, at least thirty-
two detainees attempted suicide.42 It was also at this time that the first known deaths in 
U.S. custody occurred in Afghanistan: Mullah Habibullah and Dilawar were killed at 
the U.S. Air Force Base at Bagram while being interrogated-the men had been 
chained to the ceiling by their wrists and beaten severely. As one officer later told 
Army investigators, treatment of detainees involving forcing them to remain standing, 
handcuffed to chains from the ceiling, had become known practice at Bagram.43 
Perhaps the most broad-reaching among the publicly known manifestations of the 
new policy guidance was the conclusion of a Pentagon "Working Group" on 
interrogation techniques, established by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which 
issued recommended guidance in March 2003.44 During its deliberations in early 2003, 
the Working Group had been instructed to accept as binding the OLC' s analysis on all 
legal issues concerning techniques that would constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment under U.S. and international law.45 The Group eventually 
proposed for approval a harsh list of interrogation techniques, a subset of which were 
approved by Secretary Rumsfeld in April 2003-including stress positions, 
environmental manipulation and removal of clothing, prolonged isolation, and the use 
of dogs.46 
41. SEYMOUR HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 6-7 
(2004) (describing Defense Department General Counsel Haynes receiving FBI complaints); 
Paisley Dodds, FBI Letter Complains of Aggressive Interrog_ation Techniques at Guantanamo 
Starting in 2002, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi ?file=/news/archive/2004/ 12/07 /international0839EST0512.D1L; Redacted FBI 
E-mail, "Legal Issues re: Guantanamo Bay," Dec. 9, 2002 [FOIA Doc. 4076] (remarking on a 
"review of interrogation methods by a DOD lawyer": "Basically, it appears that the lawyer 
worked hard to cwrite [sic] a legal justification for the type of interviews they (the Army) want 
to conduct here."). 
42. See Scott Higham, Joe Stephens &Margot Williams, Guantanamo-A Holding Cell in 
War on Terror, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at Al; DAVID ROSE, GUANTANAMO: THE WAR ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 64 (The New Press, 2004). 
43. Tim Golden, Abuse Cases Open Command Issues at Army Prison, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2005, at Al ("Lt. Col. John W. Loffert Jr., who took over as the intelligence operations officer 
shortly before the deaths, said he saw the practice being used as soon as he arrived at the 
detention center. 'I know they were forced to stand, handcuffed to chains that extended from the 
ceiling,' Colonel Loffert told investigators. 'Their hands were approximately chest-level. It was 
plainly visible and discussed as a technique' during an inquiry ordered by the American military 
commander at Bagram after the deaths."). 
44. WORKING GROUP, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/Pentagon 
ReportMarch. pdf. 
45 . Detention Policies and Military Justice: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Personnel 
of the S. Comm. of Armed Services, 109th Congress 15 (2005) [hereinafter Graham Hearing]; 
CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
46. Memorandum from Gen. Counsel for the Dep't of Defense to the Commander, U.S. 
Southern Command, Re: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16, 
2003), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127 /02.12.02.pdf. 
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The guidance also made its way to field commanders in Iraq. For example, 
Secretary Rumsfeld sent an envoy to Iraq in summer 2003 to jump-start what were 
perceived as inadequate interrogation operations there. He ordered Major General 
Miller to Abu Ghraib, where Miller instructed field commanders on the techniques that 
had been approved initially for limited use at Guantanamo Bay.47 Miller used the 
Working Group techniques as a "baseline" for his recommendations.48 Following 
Miller's visit, on September 14, 2003, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, then U.S. 
Army Commander of the Coalition Joint Task Force in Iraq, issued an order 
authorizing the use of twenty-nine interrogation techniques, including the use of dogs 
to exploit "Arab fear of dogs," isolation, stress positions, sensory and sleep 
deprivation, and environmental manipulation.49 Less than a month later, following 
objections from military attorneys finding many of the techniques "overly 
aggressive,"50 Sanchez modified his previous order, but continued to authorize 
interrogators to "control" the lighting, heating, food, shelter, and clothing given to 
detainees. 51 
Apart from the authorization of techniques that themselves approached or 
transgressed the line of what had long been thought unlawful under U.S. and 
international law,52 the orders were vague enough, and changeable enough, so as to 
47. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 24-25; MILLER REPORT, supra note 15, at 2; R. Jeffrey 
Smith, General ls Said to Have Urged Use of Dogs, WASH. PosT, May 26, 2004, at Al. 
48. MIU.ER REPORT, supra note 15, at 2 (reporting use of working group techniques as a 
"baseline"); Smith, supra note 48, at Al (reporting that the head of military intelligence at Abu 
Ghraib told Army investigators that '"[Miller] said that they used military working dogs at 
Gitmo, and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which, you know, you could 
get information' from [detainees]."). 
49. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 25 . 
50. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 8. 
51. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 16, 26; SCHLESINGERREPORT,supra note 15, at 10, 14-
15, 37-38. 
52. While a full analysis of the legality of these orders is beyond the scope of this Article, 
several military officials have now acknowledged that the treatment authorized at least raises 
serious questions about the meaning of legal obligations to ensure humane treatment. See, e.g., 
CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 10 ("[l]nterrogations were sufficiently aggressive that they 
highlighted the difficult question of precisely defining the boundaries of humane treatment of 
detainees."); Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Sanchez to Commander of U.S. Central Command, 
Re: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (Sept. 14, 2003) (noting environmental 
manipulation may be considered inhumane treatment in certain circumstances). 
Indeed, at least some of the techniques at one time or another directly authorized-including 
prolonged isolation, stress positions, sensory and sleep deprivation, and environmental 
manipulation, depending on their severity and use in combination-appear to run contrary to 
punitive provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and federal criminal law, as well as 
constitutional prohibitions and treaty obligations. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000) ("Any 
person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, 
any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."); § 924 
(maiming);§ 928 (assault); § 933 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 2340 (criminalizing "torture," including any "act committed by a person acting under 
the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering ( other 
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or 
physical control"). 
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spawn a new problem. The uncertain effect of the broad, general guidance, coupled 
with the proliferation of various interrogation techniques that differed among theaters 
of operation, agencies, and military units-all of which operated in close proximity to 
one another--caused serious confusion among U.S. troops on the ground.53 Indeed, as 
one army general investigating the abuses after the fact noted: "By October 2003, 
interrogation policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it 
became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at what level non-
doctrinal approaches had to be approved. "54 It was during this period, as later became 
painfully clear, that some of the worst torture and abuse occurred. 
Relevant constitutional prohibitions implicated by such techniques include substantive due 
process protection against treatment that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (physical force to extract evidence from body); amounts to cruel or 
unusual punishment, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S . 730, 738 (2002) (prolonged use of painful 
restraints, temperature and dietary manipulation, and humiliation); or renders evidence or 
information gained so unreliable as to be inadmissible in any judicial proceeding, see, e.g., 
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968) (sleep and food deprivation, along with 
deprivation of outside contact, render confession involuntary); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 
143, 153 ( 1944) ( confession involuntary after 36-hour incommunicado interrogation); Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940) (prolonged solitary confinement, along with "[t]he rack, 
the thumbscrew, [and] the wheel," renders confession involuntary). 
Treaties to which the United States is signatory also prohibit torture and cruel treatment. 
These include Geneva Convention Common Article 3 (prohibiting "violence to life and 
person . . . murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture"), as well as the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 75, June 8, 1977, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-
2, 1125 U.N. T.S. 609 ("[P]ersons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not 
benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be 
treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by 
this Article . ... "). They also include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976) ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment."), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 16(2), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) 
[hereinafter "CAT''] (obligating Convention parties to "prevent in any territory under [their] 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to [acts of] torture"). 
Without addressing the legality of authorized techniques per se, the Administration has 
maintained that neither U.S. constitutional nor treaty protections apply to non-citizens held on 
U.S. military bases or other areas of U.S. control overseas. See Responses of Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Nominee to be Attorney General to the Written Questions of Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, Answers 9, 14 and 20 (Jan. 2005); Responses of Alberto R. Gonzales, Nominee to be 
Attorney General to the Written Questions of Senator Russell D. Feingold (January 2005) 
(discussing Torture and Inhumane Treatment, Answer 2(c)). 
53. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 14, 33-38, 70, 81 ; FAYREPORT,supranote 
14, at 16, 21-30, 42-44, 52-55, 118-19; JONES REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-15; Frontline: 
The Torture Question (PBS television broadcast Oct. 18, 2005) (quoting Gen. Paul Kem), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/. 
54. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 8. 
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B. Inaction 
In the face of what was at best uncertainty about the rules came an absence of 
correction when laws were breached. Both military doctrine and U.S. law have 
recognized for the past fifty years that commanders play a pivotal role in checking the 
appropriate use of military power. The doctrine of command responsibility, applied by 
the U.S. Supreme Court most famously in 1946, 55 imposes liability on superior officers 
if they (1) exercised effective control over subordinates who engaged in torture or 
abuse of detainees in violation of the law of nations; (2) knew or had reason to know of 
their subordinates' unlawful conduct; and (3) despite this knowledge, failed to take 
reasonable measures to prevent their subordinates' conduct. That doctrine has yet to be 
invoked in connection with any case of detainee torture or abuse since September 11. 
Yet by January 2004-three months before the publication of the Abu Ghraib 
photos-the list of clues that senior military and civilian commanders knew that 
torture, or at least cruelty, was occurring under their command was extensive. 
Beginning in early 2002, organizations-including the International Committee of Red 
Cross, the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Human 
Rights First-began writing letters to the Secretary of Defense and other officials in the 
U.S. government (including field commanders), raising concerns about the treatment of 
captured detainees. 56 
55. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). A commander "may be responsible for war crimes 
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons subject to their 
control." U.S. ARMY, FIEW MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND W ARFARE1501; see also JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, LAW OFW AR DESKBOOK, Ch. 8 (Cdr. Brian J. Bill ed., 2000). 
56. See, e.g., Letter from Amnesty Int' ! to Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of 
Defense (Jan. 7, 2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/lndex/engAMR5 l 0052002? 
OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%5CUSA; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483, 1 47, 
delivered to the U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003nl5 (July 17, 2003); FAY REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 65-fJ? (indicating that another officer discussed ICRC complaints with 
Karpinski; Pappas and Karpinski received "final report" in November); TAGUBAREP0RT, supra 
note 15, at 7 (confirming date of Miller's visit); The File: Prison Abuse, S.F. CHRON., June 20, 
2004, at Al? ("Last November, the Red Cross gave notice to Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top 
U.S. officer in Iraq, outlining abuses it had uncovered at Abu Ghraib."); Andrew Gully, lraqi 
POWs Say They Were Tortured by Coalition Forces: Amnesty, AGENCEFR.-PRESSE, May 16, 
2003; Douglas Jehl & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Military Disputed Protected Status of Prisoners Held 
in lraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at Al2; Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Officer Says Army 
Tried to Curb Red Cross Visits to Prison in lraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at Al; Neil 
MacFarquhar & Neela Banerjee, Army is Reluctant to Flaunt Photos of Hussein's Sons, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jul. 24, 2003 at Al; Mark Matthews, Powell Says Bush Was 'lnformed' of Red Cross 
Concerns, Officials Advised President 'In General Terms' About Reports of Abuse, He Says, 
BALT. SUN, May 12, 2004, at 12A; Johanna McGeary, The Scandal 's Growing Stain: Abuses by 
U.S. Soldiers in lraq Shock the World and Roil the Bush Administration, TIME, May 17, 2004, 
at 26; REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITIEEOFTHE REDCROSS ONTHETREATMENTBYTHE 
COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT, AND INTERROGATION 3, 15 (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter 
ICRC February 2004 Report], available at www.informationclearinghouse.info/ 
pdf/icrc_iraq.pdf (indicating it interrupted its visits and "requested an explanation from 
authorities"); Peter Slevin & Robin Wright, Early Alarm Bells Sounded, Ignored: Abuse 
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These organizations, as well as reports in the mainstream U.S. media, documented 
allegations of "stress and duress" techniques in interrogation (including sleep 
deprivation and isolation), as well as hooding, beating, electric shock, and deaths of 
detainees in U.S. custody, some dramatically listed in official leaked documents as a 
result of "blunt force trauma" at the hands of U.S. authorities.57 As was later revealed, 
internal memoranda from FBI agents, Army Criminal Investigations Command, and 
other U.S. government agencies were reporting similar concerns. By January 2004, 
Army criminal investigators had copies of the Abu Ghraib photos, and by February, 
Army Major General Antonio Taguba had issued an internal report detailing the torture 
at Abu Ghraib. 58 As U.S. Central Command head General John Abizaid later testified 
to Congress in May 2004: "[W]e should have known. And we should have uncovered it 
and taken action before it [detainee abuse] got to the point that it got to. I think there's 
no doubt about that. "59 
Despite all of these reports, essentially no investigative progress had been made by 
2004 in some of the most serious cases (including interrogation-related homicides of 
Repons Began Almost at War's Stan, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 2004, at Al4; Letter from Human 
Rights Watch to George W. Bush, President, United States of America (Dec. 26, 2002) 
available athttp://www.hrw.org/press/2002/ 12/us 1227 .htm [hereinafter Letter to Bush]; Letter 
from the Lawyers Committee to Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Jan. 14, 2003) 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/us_law_let_Ol 1403.pdf [hereinafter Letter 
to Wolfowitz]; Memorandum from Amnesty Int'!, Re: Concerns Relating to Law and Order, 
24-26, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/lndex/ENGMDEl41572003 [hereinafter 
Memorandum from Amnesty Int'!]; Amnesty Int' l, USA, Chronology of Correspondence and 
Action, NEWS AMNESTY (Mar. 27, 2003), http://news.amnesty.org/pages/USchronology2; Peter 
Eisler & Tom Squitieri, Red Cross Repon Describes Systematic U.S. Abuse in Iraq, 
USATODAY.COM, May 10, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-10-
redcross_x.htm; Ed Johnson, Coalition Troops Are Accused of Tonure, AsSOCIATED PRESS 
ONLINE, May 16, 2003 ("Amnesty International is investigating claims that British and 
American troops tortured prisoners of war in Iraq with night-long beatings and, in at least one 
case, electric shocks, the group said Friday."); Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, DoD News 
Briefing, http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2002/t04152002_t0415sd.html; Transcript: Senate 
Hearing on Iraq Prison Abuse, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 19, 2004, 
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/articles/ A3985 l-2004May 19 _ 4.html. 
57. Press Release, Army Criminal Investigation Command, Army Criminal Investigators 
Outline 27 Confirmed or Suspected Detainee Homicides for Operation Enduring Freedom, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mar. 25, 2005) ("blunt force trauma"), available at 
http://www.cid.army.mil/Documents/OIFOEF%20Homicides.pdf, at 3-4; see also The File: 
Prison Abuse, supra note 56 ("Last November, the Red Cross gave notice to Gen. Ricardo 
Sanchez, the top U.S. officer in Iraq, outlining abuses it had uncovered at Abu Ghraib."); Gully, 
supra note 56; Jehl & Lewis, supra note 56; Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 56; Matthews, supra 
note 56; McGeary, supra note 56; Slevin & Wright, supra note 56; Letter to Bush, supra note 
56; Letter to Wolfowitz, supra note 56; Memorandum from Amnesty Int'!, supra note 56; Eisler 
& Squitieri, supra note 56; Johnson, supra note 56 ("Amnesty International is investigating 
claims that British and American troops tortured prisoners of war in Iraq with night-Jong 
beatings and, in at least one case, electric shocks, the group said Friday."). 
58. 151 CONG. REc. S8772, (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (debate concerning the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006). 
59. Transcript: Senate Hearing on Iraq Prison Abuse, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, 
available at http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/articles/ A39851-2004Mayl 9 _ 4.html. 
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detainees in U.S. custody),6() and commanders overseeing units in which some of the 
worst abuse had happened had not been disciplined; rather, most had been or soon 
were to be promoted.61 To date, the most senior officer to be punished criminally in 
connection with a detainee death is a Marine Corps major.62 
60. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 5. For example, Mullah Habibullah and Dilawar, 
two Afghan detainees, were killed in U.S. custody in December 2002 at the Bagram detention 
facility while being interrogated by members of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion. Even 
after U.S. military physicians concluded that the cause of the detainees' deaths was homicide, 
the commander of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan continued to insist publicly that the two 
detainees had died of natural causes. See Carlotta Gall, U.S. Military Investigating Death of 
Afghan in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at Al4 ("A death certificate, dated Dec. 13 and 
signed by Maj. Elizabeth A. Rouse, a pathologist with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 
based in Washington, says the man died as a result of 'blunt force injuries to lower extremities 
complicating coronary artery disease."'); Marc Kaufman, Army Probing Deaths of 2 Afghan 
Prisoners, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2003, at Al3 ('The army previously reported that Dilawar had 
died of a heart attack and Habibullah of a blood clot. The fact that an Army pathologist had 
listed the two deaths as homicides was first reported in today's New York Times."); see also 
Carlotta Gall & David Rohde, Afghan Abuse Charges Raise New Questions on Authority, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at AlO (referring to statements by McNeill and other officials in 
February 2003 that failed to disclose finding of homicide). 
61. See Susan Taylor Martin, Report Steers Clear of Interrogator 's Boss, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, May 8, 2004, http://www.sptimes.com/2004/05/08/Worldandnation/Report_steers 
_clear_o.shtml; Jackie Spinner, Abu Ghraib Policy Defended-Having MP' s Assist Intelligence 
Didn't Cause Abuse, General Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2004, at All (reporting that the 
month after the Abu Ghraib photos became public, Major General Miller was made senior 
commander in charge of detention operations in Iraq); Dennis Wagner, New Fort Huachuca 
Chief Focused on the Future, ARiz. REP., May 4, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com 
/arizonarepublic/local/articles/O504fast04.htrnl (reporting that Major General Barbara Fast, a 
military intelligence commander in Iraq, who reported directly to defendant Sanchez, had been 
assigned to lead the Army's main interrogation training facility at Fort Huachuca, Arizona in 
April 2005); Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, V Corps Commanding General, 
Biography, http://www.vcorps.army.mil/leaders/Biography-SanchezRicardoS.pdf (indicating 
that defendant Sanchez, who has been identified as bearing command responsibility for the 
torture and abuse in Iraq by numerous Pentagon investigations, now leads the Army's V Corps 
in Europe); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, General Officer Announcements (Mar. 4, 
2004), http://www.dod.gov/releases/2004/nr20040304-0408.htrnl (reporting that Lieutenant 
General Dan McNeill-who oversaw military operations in Afghanistan during the time that 
detainees were tortured to death at the Bagram detention facility and who claimed there were no 
indications of abuse leading to the deaths despite autopsy reports finding severe trauma to the 
detainees' bodies-received a fourth star and was promoted to Commanding General, U.S. 
Army Forces Command, in March 2004). 
62. The highest ranking military member criminally punished is Marine Major Clarke 
Paulus, who was found guilty of maltreatment and dereliction of duty in connection with the 
death of an Iraqi prisoner and dismissed from the service. See Monica Davey, An Iraqi Police 
Officer's Death, A Soldier's Varying Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2005, at Al; Francis J. 
Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, Detainee Details, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Sept. 22, 2005, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comrnent/harvey _schoomaker20050922O82 l .asp; U.S. Dep 't of 
Defense, News Transcript, DoD News Briefing, June 1, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
transcripts/2005/tr200506O l-secdef298 l .html 
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It was in part for these reasons that Pentagon investigations later concluded that 
"leader responsibility and command responsibility, systemic problems and issues also 
contributed to the volatile environment in which the abuse occurred."63 Former 
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's report concurred; the widespread abuse was 
"not just the failure of some individuals to follow known standards, and [it is] more 
than the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both institutional 
and personal responsibility at higher levels."64 A review of Department of Defense 
(DoD) interrogation operations prepared by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III and 
released ( only in executive summary form) in 2005 went further, describing 
development of the interrogation policy in which senior DoD officials failed 
adequately to respond to reports of cruel treatment of detainees and provided 
inadequate guidance on interrogation techniques in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
summary acknowledges that abuses were caused in part by "a failure to react to early 
warning signs of abuse" and that "stronger leadership and greater oversight would have 
lessened the likelihood of abuse. "65 
C. Resources, Training, and a Plan 
Finally, Pentagon and other post hoc investigations have held up planning and 
training failures as significantly to blame for much of the confusion and lawlessness 
that at times reigned in the field of operations in Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and Iraq. 
Most of the after-action military investigations into torture and abuse were categorical 
in their criticism: "[P]re-war planning [did] not include[] planning for detainee 
operations" in Iraq, according to Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, tasked with 
investigating the Abu Ghraib Prison and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade.66 
Personnel responsible for detention operations in Iraq were burdened with assignments 
from both the regular chain of command and from the newly formed Coalition 
Provisional Authority. With no planning for major detention operations, much less an 
insurgency, the ratio of detainees to military police at facilities like Abu Ghraib in June 
2004 rose to 75:1 (about 7,000 prisoners to about 92 military police).67 And all this in 
facilities in which command exercised no regular oversight, routine inspections and 
monitoring were absent, and no JAG officers (military lawyers charged with 
monitoring operational legal compliance) appeared to have been dedicated to 
interrogation operations per se.68 
Perhaps greater in impact than all of these, however, was a lack of training for 
troops or command engaged in detention and interrogation operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq-a factor cited in every major military investigation conducted since the Abu 
63. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 8. 
64. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. 
65. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 16. 
66. JONES REPORT, supra note 15, at 24. 
67. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 47, 54, 60; see also CHURCH REPORT, supra 
note 15, at 3 ("Another missed opportunity ... is that we found no evidence that specific 
detention or interrogation lessons learned from previous conflicts (such as those from the 
Balkans, or even those from earlier conflicts such as Vietnam) were incorporated into planning 
for operations in support of the Global War on Terror."). 
68. DAIG REPORT, supra note 15, at 15, 19. 
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Ghraib photos were released as contributing to torture and abuse in U.S. custody.69 In 
Afghanistan, military police who engaged in detention operations at the U.S. Air Force 
Base in Bagram (the primary U.S. detention facility in the country) in late 2002 report 
having been given only one hour of instruction on the levels of force to be used on 
detainees.70 Noncommissioned officers in charge of interrogators at Bagram reported 
that the newly arrived military interrogators were unprepared and inexperienced, 71 and 
that what training they had received was based on Cold War-era models of the subjects 
trainees might face in interviews. 72 
In Iraq, the situation was often worse. The 372nd Military Police Company-the 
unit in charge of military police operations at Abu Ghraib during the period when the 
worst abuses were talcing place-was a combat support unit, with no training at all in 
detainee operations.73 A post-Abu Ghraib survey conducted by the Army Inspector 
General found non-commissioned officers complaining that they had received little 
detention operations training, and that training exercises had not involved instruction in 
how to process or assign a legal status to detainees.74 Reservists in particular (many of 
whom did not know they would be engaging in detention operations until after they 
were deployed) cited the confusing difference between what training they had received 
on the Geneva Conventions, and the new instructions they were receiving in the field. 75 
At more senior levels, eighty-seven percent of units stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq 
inspected by the Army Inspector General post-Abu Ghraib responded that the basic 
professional military education they had received lacked instruction on conducting 
detainee operations. 76 
69. See DAIG REPORT, supra note 15, at 36 (noting that "[t]actical Military Intelligence 
officers are not adequately trained on how to manage the full spectrum of the collection and 
analysis of human intelligence"); FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 16-19 (noting in part that 
"[v]ery little training is available or conducted to train command and staff elements on the 
conduct, direction, and oversight of interrogation operations"); SCHI.ESINGER REPORT, supra 
note 15, at 55 (noting that "[t]he MP detention units did not receive detention-specific training 
during their mobilization period, which was a critical deficiency" and that "there was no theater-
specific training"); TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 15, at 19 ("I find that prior to its deployment to 
Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had 
received no training in detention/internee operations."). 
70. Soldier in Afghan Case Said Ill-Trained, AsSOCIATED PREss, Aug. 16, 2005, available 
at http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_trained_081605,00.html. 
71. Tim Golden, Anny Faltered in Investigating Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 
2005, at 11; Tim Golden, Abuse Cases Open Command Issues at Anny Prison, N. Y. TiMEs, Aug. 
8, 2005, at Al. 
72. CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: TASKFORCE500ANDAMERICA'S 
SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA, at xxi, XXV, 44-45 (2004). 
73. See Summary oflnterview by Taguba Panel with Sgt. First Class, 372d Military Police 
Company, in Abu Ghraib, Iraq (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia 
/released/a85.pdf (interviewee's name redacted). 
74. DAIG REPORT, supra note 15, at 81; see also CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 19 
("Few U.S. personnel, however, had received specific training relevant to detainee screening 
and medical treatment. As a result, in Afghanistan and Iraq we found inconsistent field-level 
implementation of specific requirements."). 
75. DAIG REPORT, supra note 15, at 81, 83-84. 
76. Id. The problem was particularly acute with inspected reservist units, many members of 
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As with the other factors described in this Part, lack of training alone is probably 
inadequate to explain the dozens of detainee deaths in U.S. custody, as well as the 
hundreds of reported incidents of torture and other forms of abuse. But when 
compounded by the shifting guidance to the field described above, the lack of theater-
specific or skill-specific training made significantly more likely the abuses eventually 
documented in U.S. detention and interrogation operations since 2002. 
II. EXECUTNE LIMITS: FINDING CONSTRAINTS THAT WORK 
The record above makes it difficult to doubt that at least some number of the 
structural checks built into the federal government failed-either to prevent the policy 
and operational decisions that contributed to the abuse, or to forestall the widespread 
incidents of abuse in practice. Perhaps most striking among these failed checks, 
Congress was largely absent from engagement in U.S. policies of detention and 
interrogation from 2001 through much of2005.77 Apart from the broad Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF)78 (which expressly discusses neither detention nor 
interrogation operations) and the USA PATRIOT Act79 (authorizing limited detention 
domestically of immigration law violators but without reference to coercive human 
intelligence gathering), both passed in the weeks immediately following September 11, 
Congress took no legislative action on these issues throughout the period when the 
worst abuses were taking place. 80 
which reported that they were not notified that they would be involved in detainee operations 
until after their deployment overseas. Id. at 83 ("Interviewed Soldiers gave examples of being 
placed in stressful situations in internment/resettlement (1/R) facility with thousands of non-
compliant detainees and not being trained to handle them."). 
77. See Kinkopf, supra note 8, at 1169. As Professor Kinkopf suggests, Congress's silence 
is surely due in part to the uniformity in political control of both political branches of 
government. Id. at 1175. President Bush also no doubt benefited from a prolonged period of 
political unity following the attacks of September 11, as the country and its leaders sought to 
present a common front to the supporters of those who perpetrated the attacks. 
78. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2000 & 
Supp. 2002)). 
79. USA PATRIOT Act: Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
80. Notwithstanding the passage at the end of 2005 of the McCain and Graham 
Amendments to Defense Appropriations measures, see Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006)) (regulating the detention and treatment of "war on 
terror" detainees), Congress's first four years of silence speaks for itself. The sole exception to 
the absence of any congressional check on these issues is the Durbin Amendment passed in 
October 2004. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1093(c), 118 Stat. 1811 (2004). The provision, which was in many 
respects declarative of existing regulations, requires the Secretary of Defense to report regularly 
to the relevant committees in the U.S. House and Senate on the number and nationality of 
detainees in military custody, as well as on the number of detainees released from custody 
during the reporting period; it also requires the Secretary to report on the legal status of those 
detained and to report whether detainees once held by the United States have been transferred to 
other countries. The first compliance deadline came and went on July 28, 2005, with no report 
from the Pentagon. While Pentagon sources now say that at least some of the required 
information has been transmitted to Congress, some in classified form, it remains unclear 
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In some respects, Congress's relative silence on detention and interrogation powers 
should not be surprising; as has been the case increasingly through the past fifty years, 
the political incentives for members of Congress to engage in questions of security and 
international affairs have come to weigh heavily in favor of inaction. Congress is 
regularly stuck with the blame for failed initiatives, but popular support almost 
invariably rallies around the executive under any circumstances when international 
security affairs are at the fore. 81 It thus seems squarely in the political interest of both 
branches to leave the details of war fighting-of which detention and interrogation 
policy are part-to the executive alone. 
At the same time, the past several years have seen some noteworthy shifts in 
executive policy and practice with respect to intelligence gathering in particular, and 
the treatment of detainees in the "war on terror" more generally. For example, the 
Department of Defense withdrew within months some of the most aggressive 
interrogation techniques initially authorized after the OLC memo was completed in 
2002. Without change of executive administration, the OLC memo itself (setting forth 
a sweeping view of executive power) was rescinded in early 2004, replaced by 
noticeably narrower guidance to the executive about the scope of his power in this 
area. And where investigations into interrogation-related deaths in U.S. custody in 
2002-03 had once languished, a number (if not all) of those involved are now facing 
prosecution. The United States' record of executive excess over the past three years 
has not been good, but it could have been worse. What brought about the shifts? 
This Part argues that three key forces have been at least somewhat effective to 
constrain executive power during this period-and that they are often viewed as among 
the least democratic in our society: the professional military; the public oversight 
organizations of civil society; and the federal courts. While these institutions are far 
from sufficient to ensure the legality of executive action, recent experience has shown 
them to be essential features of a spectrum of checks on executive power. 
A. The Professional Military 
At least since the American Civil War, professionalism has been understood as a 
defining feature of the modem American military.82 By military professionalism, 
Huntington (and the many scholars who have engaged his work since) meant most 
broadly the institutional acquisition and maintenance of a set of technical skills, norms, 
and ethics-as may be found in medicine, science, or law-that define and distinguish 
those trained in the profession from others. 83 One of the key reasons Huntington 
identified as to why such professionalism in the military was desirable was its role in 
whether this information may be made public. See E-mail from Dep' t of Defense official to 
Human Rights First (Nov. 29, 2005 4:28 PM EST) (on file with Human Rights First). 
81 . THEODORE J. LoWI AND BENJAMIN GINSBURG, AMERICAN GoVERNMENT: FREEDOM AND 
POWER 290-93 (1990). 
82. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOWIER AND THE STATE 254 (1957); William B. 
Skelton, Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition , 60 J. MIL. 
HIST. 325 (1996). 
83. HUNTINGTON, supra note 82, at 7-8, 254-66; see also, e.g., DoN M. SNIDER, JOHN A. 
NAGL & TONY PFAFF, ARMY PROFESSIONALISM, THE MILITARY ETHIC, AND OFFICERSHIP IN THE 
21ST CENTURY (1999), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ 
display .cfm ?PublD=:282. 
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helping to preserve and also moderate civilian control. Among other things, 
Huntington theorized that "[a] strong, integrated, highly professional officer corps ... 
immune to politics and respected for its military character, would be a steadying 
balance wheel in the conduct of policy."84 
With the explosion of international human rights and humanitarian law after World 
War II (including the ratification of, among other treaties, the modem Geneva 
Conventions), compliance with increasingly formalized international rules and norms 
began to emerge as a key feature of professional military training and ethics.85 But it 
was not until after the serious human rights crimes and other failures of the Vietnam 
War, including the U.S. military's own participation in events like the My Lai 
massacre, that these norms began to manifest themselves more fully in military training 
and culture. Critically, high-level military investigations into U.S. war crimes during 
Vietnam found, among other things, that troops and command had been inadequately 
trained in Geneva law and the values behind it.86 Among the actions taken to correct 
84. HUNTINGTON, supra note 82, at 464; see also id. at 237 (theorizing that military 
professionals have an "awareness of the science of war distinct from those other sciences 
existing outside it and from those subordinate sciences contributing to it," namely, politics and 
technical education). 
85. Law and its enforcement within the military was hardly a new concept. The Army has 
had a permanent Judge Advocate General's Corps (military lawyers) since 1862, as the military 
expanded dramatically to fight the Civil War. Patrick Finnegan, The Study of Law as a 
Foundation of Leadership and Command: The History of Law Instruction at the United States 
Military Academy at West Point, 181 MIL. L. REV. 112, 114 (2004). Law had been taught at the 
U.S. military academy well before then, but in 1863 began to include the study of the then 
newly codified Laws of War. Id. at 114 (citing War Department General Order 100 adopting the 
Lieber Code, precursor to the modern Geneva Conventions). But there is no question the role of 
military lawyers and basic military legal instruction grew substantially after World War II, 
especially with the post-World War II adoption by Congress of the more-or-less modem 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at 122. Later, with the end of the draft in 1973, 
professional training increased significantly, not only in technical, strategic, and tactical war-
fighting skills, but also in ethics, policy-making, and political-military affairs. In particular, in 
1973 the Army established a separate command entity called TRADOC, Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, to address challenges to military professionalism, including those coming 
out of Vietnam. See, e.g., Erik Blaine Riker-Coleman, Reflection and Reform: Professionalism 
and Ethics in the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1968-1975, at 31, 38-39 (2001) (unpublished 
thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) available at http://www.unc.edu/-chaosl/ 
reform.pdf. Today, TRADOC includes twenty-seven schools (including, for example, the well 
known Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California) and more than 10,000 instructors, 
and is responsible for developing training programs for some 390,000 active and reserve 
component soldiers. See generally U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
86. Following the events at My Lai, General William Westmoreland appointed Lt. Gen. 
William Peers to investigate what went wrong; the resulting report, see DEPARTMENT OF TIIE 
ARMY, REPORT OF TIIE DEPARTMENT OF TIIE ARMY REVIEW OFTIIE PRELIMINARY INvEsnGA TIONS 
INTO TIIE MY LAI INCIDENT 1-11 (1970) [hereinafter PEERS REPORT], concluded, inter alia, that 
the troops involved in the massacre "were not adequately trained as to ... [t]heirresponsibilities 
concerning the procedures for the reporting of war crimes" or "[t]he provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions." Id. at 12-8. See also Seymour M. Hersh, My Lai and, Its Omens, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 1998, at A25 (citing unpublished 1967 Pentagon report, "Alleged Atrocities by U.S. 
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this perceived failing, the U.S. Army Field Manual was updated in 1976 and for the 
first time described the main objective of wartime detention operations not as the 
"acquisition of maximum intelligence information," but rather as the "implementation 
of the Geneva Conventions."87 
It was in this post-Vietnam era training and culture that a number of the military 
professionals working in the Pentagon after September 11 had been steeped. Based on 
the little historical knowledge available so far about interrogation decision-making 
inside the Pentagon since 2001, it is clear that a handful of these officers ended up 
having an important moderating effect on some of the most aggressive interrogation 
measures advocated by civilian policy-makers at the Pentagon. Thus, for example, the 
December 2002 interrogation techniques that had been authorized by Defense 
Secretary Rurnsfeld (including threatening detainees with dogs, placing them in painful 
"stress" positions, etc.) prompted a number of Judge Advocate General (JAG) lawyers 
and service general counsels to object vigorously, arguing that the techniques were 
inconsistent with existing law regarding detainee treatment. In response, the December 
techniques were rescinded.88 
Likewise, when the Working Group that Rurnsfeld established after rescinding the 
December techniques issued preliminary recommendations urging similarly or more 
aggressive interrogation techniques, top JAG officers in each of the services responded 
with stem memos in opposition. 89 In their opposition, the military lawyers expressly 
Military Forces in South Vietnam") (describing Pentagon findings that training in the Geneva 
Conventions was inadequate). 
87. James F. Gebhardt, The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Anny Detainee Doctrine and 
Experience, MIL. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 44, 50; see also James J. McGowan, Jr., Training in 
the Geneva and Hague Conventions: A Dead Issue?, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1974, at 5; William 
Greider, Teaching of War Law Revitalized by Anny, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1971, at 1. 
88. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, to Commander, U.S. 
Southern Command, Re: Counter-Resistance Techniques (Jan. 15, 2003) (rescinding his 
December 2, 2002 approval of the use of all Category II techniques and one Category Ill 
technique); see also CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 4, 6; SCHI.ESINGER REPORT, supra note 
15, at 7 (noting that Rumsfeld rescinded the majority of the December 2, 2002 techniques "[a]s 
a result of concerns raised by the Navy General Counsel"). 
89. See 151 CONG. REc. S8794 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) 
(introducing into the congressional record memos prepared by service JAG officers, including 
Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC, Re: U.S. 
Marine Corps, Working Group Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations (Feb. 27, 2003); 
Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, Re: Draft 
Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the Legal, Policy and 
Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the 
War on Terrorism (Mar. 3, 2003); Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge 
Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, Re: Comment on Draft Report and Recommendations of the 
Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of 
Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. 6, 2003); 
Memorandum from Rear Adm. Michael F. Lohr, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy, Re: 
Working Group Recommendations Relating to Interrogation of Detainees (Feb. 6, 2003); 
Memorandum from Rear Adm. Michael F. Lohr, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy, Re: 
Comments on the 6 March 2003 Detainee Interrogation Working Group Report (Mar. 13, 2002); 
Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, 
Re: Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and 
Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the 
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condemned as inaccurate and counterproductive the OLC legal opinion indicating that 
the executive had the power to authorize interrogation techniques bordering on 
torture.90 And they emphasized the harms involved in implementing techniques 
contrary to well-established military training since Vietnam. 
[T]he use of the more extreme interrogation techniques simply is not how the U.S. 
armed forces have operated in recent history. We have taken the legal and moral 
"high-road" in the conduct of our military operations regardless of how others may 
operate. Our forces are trained in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day 
they enter active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict and code of 
conduct training have been mandated by Congress and emphasized since the Viet 
Nam conflict when our POWs were subjected to torture by their captors. We need 
to consider the overall impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as 
giving official approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation 
techniques that U.S. forces have consistently been trained are unlawful.91 
Ultimately, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld authorized only a subset of the techniques the 
Working Group (based on the OLC analysis) had recommended.92 
Military law officers succeeded to a similar extent in moderating the most 
aggressive interrogation orders issued in the field during the war in Iraq. Recall that Lt. 
Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then U.S. Army Commander of the Coalition Joint Task Force 
in Iraq, issued a September 14, 2003, order authorizing the use of twenty-nine 
interrogation techniques, including exploiting an "Arab fear of dogs," prolonged 
isolation, stress positions, sensory and sleep deprivation, and environmental 
War on Terrorism (Feb. 5, 2003)), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law 
/etn/pdf/jag-memos-072505.pdf). 
90. See, e.g., Memorandum from Maj . Gen. Thomas J. Romig, Judge Advocate General, 
U.S. Anny, Re: Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the Legal, 
Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed 
Forces in the War on Terrorism (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
us_law/etn/pdf/jag-memos-072505.pdf. 
Id. 
While the OLC analysis speaks to a number of defenses that could be raised on 
behalf of those who engage in interrogation techniques later perceived to be 
illegal, the 'bottom line' defense proffered by OLC is an exceptionally broad 
concept of 'necessity.' This defense is based upon the premise that any existing 
federal statutory provision or international obligation is unconstitutional per se, 
where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the President, acting in his 
capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as essential to his capacity to wage war. I 
question whether this theory would ultimately prevail in either the U.S . courts or 
in any international forum. If such a defense is not available, soldiers ordered to 
use otherwise illegal techniques run a substantial risk of criminal prosecution or 
personal liability arising from a civil lawsuit. 
91. Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate 
General, Re: Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, 
Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed 
Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. 5, 2003). 
92. Compare WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 44, with Memorandum from Donald 
Rumsfeld to the Commander, Re: U.S. Southern Command on Counter-Resistance Techniques 
in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2003). 
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manipulation.93 That authorization was rescinded less than a month later, following 
objections from military attorneys finding many of the techniques "overly 
aggressive. "94 
And critically, it was the investigative report issued by Major General Antonio 
Taguba in February 2004-subsequently leaked and later described to Congress in 
hearings that followed the release of photographs of torture from Abu Ghraib--that 
helped identify and target some of those most responsible for not only acts of torture 
and abuse, but also the failures of resources, training, and corrective action.95 In the 
wake of the Taguba Report, the Army, among other things, ordered its Criminal 
Investigation Division Headquarters to initiate an operational review of all detainee 
abuse and death cases in Iraq and Afghanistan which were then on file.96 
Did senior military officials succeed in rolling back the policy guidance that 
subsequent reports have pointed to as part of the cause for widespread torture and 
abuse, or succeed in stopping the abuse itself? No. Indeed, given the primacy the 
United States has appropriately placed on civilian control of the military, it would seem 
at the very least problematic if the uniformed military did succeed in entirely thwarting 
civilian directives. 
On the other hand, it does seem clear that some military professionals repeatedly 
sought less authority to engage in coercive interrogation than civilian officials were 
prepared to give, and that the military was at least modestly successful-based on the 
advocacy force of their professional training and norms-in reining in some of the 
most aggressive techniques. And it seems clear that professional training played a 
critical role in determining reactions of military personnel to the broadest executive 
demands. The availability of this training was a source of resistance among 
commissioned officers steeped in Geneva Convention law and ethics; its absence was a 
93. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 10, 25. 
94. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 8; FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 16, 26; 
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 10, 14-15, 37-38. 
95. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 15; Testimony of Maj . Gen. Antonio Taguba before 
the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (May 11, 2004), transcript available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/Al 7812-2004Mayl I .html. Taguba's testimony 
before Congress was particularly candid. Id. at 17 ("WARNER: In simple words-your own 
soldier's language-how did this happen? TAGUBA: Failure in leadership, sir, from the brigade 
commander on down. Lack of discipline, no training whatsoever and no supervision. 
Supervisory omission was rampant."); see also, id. at 10-11 
Id. 
On 24 January, 2004, I was directed by Lieutenant General David McKieman, the 
commanding general, ARCENT/CFLCC, to conduct an investigation into the 
allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison .. .. As I assembled the 
investigation team, my specific instructions to my teammates were clear: maintain 
our objectivity and integrity throughout the course of our mission in what I 
considered to be a very grave, highly sensitive and serious situation; to be mindful 
of our personal values and the moral values of our nation; and to maintain the 
Army values in all of our dealings; and to be complete, thorough and fair in the 
course of the investigation. 
96. See Memorandum from Commander, 6th Military Police Group, Department of the 
Army, to Commander, USACIDC, Re: Operational Review of0149-03-CID469-60209, at 28 
(May 19, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/DOA_l053_l082.pdf. 
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major factor in explaining the sometimes egregiously poor behavior of active duty and 
reserve enlisted soldiers facing pressure to produce in the field. 97 While the 
professional military was not a surefire mechanism for reining in executive abuses, it 
provided a structure through which constraining forces could, at times effectively, hold 
executive power in check. 
B. The Public Oversight Organizations of Civil Society 
The phrase "civil society" has been used widely and loosely to describe a wide 
range of domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including 
major humanitarian, environmental, and human rights organizations (such as CARE, 
Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International), as well as religious 
organizations, civic networks, and a range of traditional nonprofit entities (from arts 
and cultural organizations to health care centers to domestic advocacy groups).98 
Independent media outlets are not commonly included in the category of "civil 
society"-given their for-profit motivation-but the free press has some claim to 
similar status: non-governmental entities that ideally function as a watchdog on official 
conduct. While NGOs and the press have historically been understood as forces 
essential to the sound functioning of democracy,99 the growth since World War II of 
91. See supra notes 66-73. 
98. E.g., Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65-78; LESTER M. SALAMON, ET AL., THE JOI-INS HOPKINS 
COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT SECTOR PROJECT, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2003) (describing civil 
society as composed of organizations private in nature but with a public purpose), available at 
http://www.jhu.edu/~ccss/pubs/pdf/globalciv.pdf. According to data assembled by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 195,145 
charitable nonprofit organizations in the United States employed close to nine million people in 
2002, accounting for 8.2 percent of the country's private employment. See Lester M. Salamon & 
S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Nonprofit Organizations: New Insights from QCEW Data, MONTIILY 
LABOR REv., Sept. 2005, at 21, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rnlr/2005/09/art3full.pdf. 
While the vast majority of these people are employed in health care, education, or social service 
organizations (rather than issue-specific membership organizations), id., there can be no 
question that "civil society" so defined has the potential to have a tremendous impact on public 
policy and national life. 
99. On the democracy-enhancing role of civil society organizations, see ALEx:IS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE,DEMOCRACYIN AMERICA 180--95 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969);THEFEDERALISTNo.10 
(James Madison) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987). See also LowI & GINSBURG, supra note 81, at 
533-34 (1990); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADmONS IN 
MODERN ITALY 89-90 (1993); Marina S. Ottaway, Strengthening Civil Society in Other 
Countries, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 2001, at 14, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=774. On the role of a 
free press in democracy, see Justice Black's concurrence in New York Times Co. v. United 
States: 
In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it 
must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the 
governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was 
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. 
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform 
the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in 
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highly professionalized international organizations, sophisticated domestic advocacy 
groups, and highly capitalized media corporations has prompted growing criticism of 
these entities as, ironically, undemocratic ("Who elected the NGOs?") or even anti-
democratic in nature. HJO 
To the extent that constraining the power of one branch of government is a sign of a 
well-functioning democracy, the conduct of the U.S. Government in the "war on terror" 
has provided rich material for testing the democracy-enhancing effectiveness (vel non) 
of civil society. Indeed, civil society's ability to act as an effective constraint in the 
context of human intelligence operations would be particularly impressive given that 
government intelligence operations have always presented a special challenge for 
effective oversight. A web of laws and regulations governing the use of classified 
information-driven in significant measure by appropriate policy interests in protecting 
U.S. intelligence sources and methods-requires that much of the work of the House 
and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees be carried out in secret. 101 The 
committees, responsible for reviewing the activities of more than two dozen civilian 
and military intelligence agencies, are chronically overburdened and limited by 
structural and staffing failings. 102 And although law requires the executive to keep 
government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty 
to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them 
off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell . 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
100. E.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: 
Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International 
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT'LL. 371,383 (2001) ("It is no exaggeration to 
regard the international NGOs . . . as not merely undemocratic but as profoundly 
antidemocratic."); Paul Wapner, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental 
Organizations: Paradise Lost? NGOs and Global Accountability, 3 Cm. J. INT'L L. 155 (2002) 
(summarizing arguments that NGOs Jack democratic accountability because leadership is not 
elected, accountability mechanisms are limited, and capacity for political influence is high); 
Gary Johns, The NGO Challenge: Whose Democracy Is It Anyway? (June 11, 2003) 
(unpublished conference paper), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030630johns.pdf. 
The growth of profit-driven and spin-controlled mainstream media outlets has likewise been a 
source in recent decades for increased criticism of the modem press as an anti-democratic force. 
See, e.g .• EDWARD s. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY. MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POUTICAL 
EcONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR 
DEMOCRACY (1999) (arguing that modem media benefits wealthy investors, advertisers, and 
corporate interests-not free, public choice). 
101. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 413(d); SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE U.S. SENATE, 109TH 
CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE, s. PRINT No. 109-22, at 5-7 (2005), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/rules%20of%20procedure.htm; PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON INTELLIGENCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE, 8-15 
(Comm. Print 2003), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Rulesl08.pdf. See 
generally FREDERICK M . KAISER, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, A JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLIGENCE: PROPOSALS AND OPTIONS FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND OTHERS (Aug. 25, 
2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32525.pdf. 
102. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 420 (2004) (finding that House and Senate intelligence 
committees "lack the power, influence, and sustained capability" to meet the challenges facing 
the nation's intelligence agencies); KAISER, supra note 101 (reviewing proposals to revise 
congressional oversight structures to solve current failings). 
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House and Senate intelligence committees informed of all intelligence-gathering 
activities, 103 the post-September 11 executive has regularly resisted sharing information 
even with members of Congress. 104 Because of these limits, civil society organizations 
that typically bring expert advice to Congress on a range of issues-from agricultural 
technology to drug approval to school lunch programs-are limited in their ability to 
review and consult on intelligence policy in practice. 105 
It was for these and other reasons that, in the first years following the attacks of 
September 11, a number of signs suggested civil society would be of limited 
effectiveness in checking detention and interrogation operations. The post-September 
11th media has been widely criticized for having abandoned critical assessment or 
analysis of executive "war on terror" activities. 106 The decades-old practice employed 
by human-rights NGO's of "naming and shaming" similarly (and relatedly) was 
unsuccessful at either calling attention to or remedying the serious torture and abuse in 
U.S. custody that began in 2002.107 
But while assessing the impact of civil society on effecting policy shifts is a difficult 
proposition-first and foremost because of the difficulty in isolating civil society as the 
103. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(l) ('The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence 
committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United 
States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity .... "). 
104. The controversy at the end of2005 over the thoroughness of White House briefings to 
Congress regarding the existence of a secret NSA surveillance program inside the United States, 
see James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al ("It is not clear how much the members of Congress were told about the .. 
. eavesdropping program."), is only the most recent in a series of battles between the Executive 
and Congress over access to information about U.S. intelligence operations. See, e.g., LAWYERS 
COMMITIEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AssESSING THE NEW NORMAL 8-12 (2003) ( describing clashes 
between the executive and Congress in 2002 and 2003 over, inter alia, access to information 
about the use of PATRIOT Act powers), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/ 
descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNorrnal.pdf; Douglas Jehl, White House Has Tightly 
Restricted Oversight of CIA Detentions, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2005, at A21. 
105. See Kevin Whitelaw & David E. Kaplan, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Sept. 13, 2004, at 36 (describing collapse of congressional intelligence oversight 
function in general and highlighting the inability of NGOs to intervene): 
'There is no outside organization that is providing consistent oversight, and 
whistle-blowing is not a respected tradition in the intelligence community,' says 
Rep. Rush Holt, a Democrat who sits on the House Intelligence Committee. 'There 
is nobody else to help.' Both the CIA and the intelligence committees have 
blocked the Government Accountability Office, which performs independent 
audits of the federal government, from getting access to the CIA. 
Id. See also Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005 at Bl 
(arguing that secret briefings to intelligence committee leaders alone-without staff 
input or possibility for analysis-leaves little chance for meaningful congressional 
oversight). 
106. See, e.g., Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 26, 2004. 
107. Indeed, as the discussion above should make clear, NGOs and journalists wrote letters 
and reported on incidents of torture and abuse in U.S. custody for more than two years with no 
success in, for example, obtaining a thorough investigation of homicides of two Afghan 
detainees who had been tortured to death by U.S. troops. See supra note 56-57 and 
accompanying text. 
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cause of a particular effect-there is reason here to suspect that civil society attention 
paid to the abuse and torture in U.S. operations played a significant role in driving 
executive policy change where the co-equal branches of government did not, or could 
not, act. 
Consider first, and perhaps foremost, the executive response to the publication and 
subsequent investigative coverage of the photographs of torture at Abu Ghraib in April 
2004. 108 Nearly two years' worth of letter writing, and some investigative reporting 
failed to capture public attention and therefore bring public pressure to bear on 
executive policy-making, but a handful of photographs from one "war on terror" prison 
(of the dozens then and still in operation worldwide) shifted the public discourse 
overnight. Media coverage of torture, interrogation, and abuse was sweeping. Within 
weeks of the initial story on CBS News, the Abu Ghraib scandal was on the covers of 
Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report. The Washington Post published a 
three-part series about U.S. interrogation operations, published previously secret 
statements of witnesses to the events at Abu Ghraib, and published additional photos of 
the abuse (causing its website traffic to soar). 109 Public opinion polls conducted two 
weeks after the photos were released found that seventy-seven percent of Americans 
believed the abuse they had seen could not be justified. 110 
Within weeks of the airing of the photos (in contrast to the months that had, by then, 
passed since the worst of the abuses in the summer/fall of the previous year), the 
President appeared on Arab television to condemn prisoner abuse; 111 the United States 
released some three hundred prisoners from the Abu Ghraib facility; 112 and the 
Department of Defense launched multiple major investigations into U.S. detention and 
interrogation operations overseas. 113 At the same time, the Army ordered its Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID) to review all detainee abuse and death cases in Iraq and 
Afghanistan then on file-requiring that every investigation conducted into the cases to 
108. See, e.g., 60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast Apr. 28, 2004). 
109. The Online News Association, Washingtonpost.com 's traffic soars due to Abu Ghraib 
prison coverage, June 28, 2004, http://www.cyberjoumalist.net/news/001415.php. 
110. David Paul Kuhn, Bush Ratings Fall Amid Iraq Woes, CBS NEWS, May 12, 2004, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/ l 2/politics/main6 l 7 l 22.shtml. 
111. David Paul Kuhn, Damage Control on Abu Ghraib, CBS NEWS, May 5, 2004, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/05/politics/main6158 l l .shtml. 
112. U.S. Troops Release Nearly 300from Iraq 's Abu Ghraib Prison , ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 15, 2004. 
113. See FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 4 (reporting that on June 14, 2004, the Secretary of 
Defense requested the appointment of a new investigating officer, one who outranked Lt. Gen. 
Ricardo S. Sanchez-who had commanded the Combined Joint Task Force in Iraq during 
relevant times-to review facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct of Army intelligence 
operations at Abu Ghraib); SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, (Secretary of Defense 
chartered Schlesinger panel on May 12, 2004, to review DoD detention operations); Vice 
Admiral Tom Church, Media Availability with Vice Admiral Church (May 12, 2004), 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2004/tr200405 l 2-0750.html [hereinafter Church Transcript] 
(Department of Defense News Transcript of Vice Admiral Albert T. Church's statement 
regarding receipt of orders from Secretary of Defense on May 3, 2004, to review conduct of 
detention operations at Guantanamo Bay and at Charleston, South Carolina-where, inter alia, 
U.S. citizen Jose Padilla has been held); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GETTING TO GROUND TRUTii 1-7 
(2004) (summarizing official investigations launched). 
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date be reopened and reviewed anew. 114 The FBI requested information related to 
prisoner abuse from all of its agents who had served at Guantanamo Bay, causing 
several previously unreported incidents to come to light. 115 And the Pentagon issued a 
series of policy orders to address the now widely publicized cases of detainees dying in 
U.S. custody: Army commanders were admonished to immediately report the death of 
any detainee to military law enforcement authorities, and the bodies of detainees could 
not be released until an Armed Forces medical examiner decided whether an autopsy 
was required. 116 
It is easy to contend with some certainty that public attention to the issue of prisoner 
treatment helped drive these steps; it is more difficult to determine whether the 
executive response that followed amounted to a shift in course. Nonetheless, while 
some Pentagon investigations had been launched before publication of the photos, the 
post-publication investigations were generally broader in scope, 117 and in at least one 
114. See Memorandum from the 11th Military Police Battalion to the Commander of the 
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command on Operational Review of0149-03-CID469-60209 
(May 19, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/DOA_l053_l082.pdf. 
115. See ARMY REGULATION 15-6, FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF 
DETAINEE ABUSE AT GU ANT AN AMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 1-2 (2005), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d200507l4report.pdf; E-mail from Steven C. 
McGraw to multiple redacted recipients (July 7, 2004, 14: 10 EST), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBl_3944_3947.pdf. 
116. Memorandum from U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Re: ALCID 
Memorandum 012-04, Chapter 5, CID Regulation 195-1, Criminal Investigation Operational 
Procedures 68-69 (June 7, 2004 ), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/042105/ 
9290_9388.pdf (In the case of a death of any person held as a detainee under the custody of the 
U.S. Army, the commander ... will immediately report the death to Army law enforcement 
authorities .... The body will not be released from US custody without ... approval from the 
Armed Forces Medical Examiner."); see also UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, MCWP 3-34.1: 
MILITARY POLICE IN SUPPORT OF TIIB MAGTF, at 5-4, available at 
http://www.tpub.com/content/USMC/mcwp334l/css/mcwp3341_3l.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 
2006) ("Upon receiving information concerning alleged war crimes committed by Marines, 
commanders must immediately notify the nearest CID field office."). 
117. The Taguba and Miller reports, both completed prior to the release of the photographs 
depicting abuse at Abu Ghraib, were far more narrowly focused than the Schlesinger and 
Church reports, which followed the release of the photographs. The Taguba Report looked only 
at the role of the operations of U.S. military police at Abu Ghraib, specifically on the Army's 
800th Military Police Brigade. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 15, at 6-7. The Miller Report was 
designed not to look at abuse, but rather at how to enhance the collection of intelligence. See 
MILLER REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. It was geared toward "discussing current theatre ability to 
rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence." Id. at 11. In contrast, the Schlesinger 
report, which was ordered by the Secretary of Defense in May 2004, immediately following the 
Abu Ghraib revelations, reviewed Defense Department detention operations with a somewhat 
broader mandate. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, (chartered to review DoD-wide 
detention operations). The Church report was ordered to review conduct of detention operations 
at Guantanamo Bay and at Charleston, South Carolina. Church Transcript, supra note 113. The 
very next month, in June 2004, Vice Admiral Church was directed to expand his investigation to 
include detention and interrogation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. HUMAN RIGIITS FIRST, 
supra note 113, at 11. 
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case, redesigned to address more senior levels of command. 118 The results of the 
investigations in and of themselves were rich in information, including extensively 
documenting abusive and unlawful practices. 119 This information in turn helped form 
the basis for civil lawsuits against Pentagon officials, 120 and various disciplinary 
actions against some of those involved. 121 While these actions surely did not address all 
existing causes of abuse or secure full accountability for those responsible, it is 
noteworthy that, in an era of one-party control of the political branches, anything 
happened at all. Throughout this period, there was not a single court order, act of 
Congress, or direct election that mandated the executive's actions-what change did 
come was fundamentally the result of the force of civil society pressure disfavoring 
executive conduct. 
A more complex example of civil society-driven impact may be found in the 
response to the President's nomination, in early November 2004, of former White 
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to become Attorney General-after the initial furor 
surrounding Abu Ghraib photos had begun to die down. Although Gonzales had played 
a key role in the administration's development of detention and interrogation policy ( as 
118. In June 2004, the Army replaced Major General Fay, the chief investigator of a report 
examining the role of military intelligence in the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, with 
Lieutenant General Jones, a more senior officer. Somini Sengupta, U.S. Attacks Falluja as 
Iraqis Renew Hint of Mania[ Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2004, at A7; see Lawrence Di Rita, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y of Def., and Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz, Defense 
Department Operational Update Briefing (July 28, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts 
/2004/tr20040728-1043.html (Department of Defense News Transcript of briefing by Lawrence 
Di Rita explaining that General Jones was appointed "to do the investigatory work that General 
Fay was less appropriate to do"). 
119. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 13; FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at68-95, 109. 
120. See, e.g., Consolidated Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, Ali v. 
Tappas, No. 05-cv-1377 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info 
/pdf/06105-etn-rums-complaint.pdf; Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005). 
121 . For example, MG Antonio M. Taguba made thirteen recommendations for disciplinary 
action in Part III of his investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade. One of his 
recommendations was that "BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be Relieved 
from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand." TA GUBA REPORT, 
supra note 15, at 44. Following these recommendations, Karpinski was demoted to colonel, 
relieved of command, and given a written reprimand. See Abu Ghraib Colonel Relieved of 
Command, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 12, 2005, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story 
/0,2933,156400,00.html; Repon: Demoted General Details Alleged Shoplifting Incident, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 12, 2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news 
/state/20050512-2155-ca-prisonerabuse-karpinski.html. Taguba's investigation also found: "I 
suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. 
John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) 
and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs 
as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their 
culpability." TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 15, at 48. In May 2005, Col. Pappas was relieved of 
his command of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, reprimanded, and fined $8,000 for his 
authorization of the use of dogs in interrogations. See Abu Ghraib Colonel Relieved of 
Command, ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra; David Dishneau, Abu Ghraib Officer Defends Use of 
Dogs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/16/ AR200603 l 600306.html). 
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emerged in the flood of leaked documents that appeared in the post-Abu Ghraib 
frenzy), 122 Gonzales's nomination was initially welcomed warmly by bipartisan leaders 
throughout Washington, and media coverage focused on his personal triumph in 
achieving this level of success. 123 
By the time of the Gonzales confirmation hearings in January 2005-despite the 
President's having won popular reelection in the interim-all eight Democrats on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee voted against confirmation, 124 and thirty-six Senators 
voted against Gonzales in the full Senate; the vote was the second narrowest to confirm 
an Attorney General nominee in eighty years. 125 More significantly, on the eve of the 
January confirmation hearing, the Administration for the first time formally withdrew 
the August 2002 OLC opinion narrowly defining torture-a move characterized by 
mainstream media as a "significant[] retreat[]" and a "sharply seal[ ed] back" version of 
its previous position. 126 The 2002 OLC memorandum was replaced with a new OLC 
opinion aimed directly at defusing a resurgent media focus on torture; in marked 
contrast to the 2002 version, the new memorandum began with the statement: ''Torture 
is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms."127 
Between the bold nomination in November and the confirmation struggle and policy 
reversal by January, what forces functioned to influence executive behavior? There is a 
strong argument that NGO activism was a driving force in refocusing congressional 
attention, shifting the media coverage, and deploying strategic advocacy which was 
pivotal in swaying events. Immediately following the nomination, human rights NGOs 
launched a classic advocacy campaign. Memos drafted by advocacy organizations were 
circulated broadly throughout Washington, D.C. outlining Gonzales's role in devising 
122. See HUMAN RIGIITS FIRST, ATTORNEY GENERAL CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 1-5 (2004 ), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/briefs/brief_20041220_ 
Gonz_all. pdf; Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 
24, 2004, at Al. 
123. See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Latino Tapped to Head Justice; Bush Names Longtime Aide to 
Be Next Attorney General, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 2004, at A3; Ron Hutcheson, An Inspiring 
Story, with Some Plot Twists, SEA TILE TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at A6; Ron Hutcheson, Gonzales 
Has Inspiring Personal History.Critics on Left and Right, KNIGIIT RIDDER, Nov. 11, 2004. 
124. Eric Lichtblau & Carl Hulse, Senate Panel Approves Gonzales on a Party-Line Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A21. 
125. Charles Babington & Dan Eggen, Senate Confirms Gonzales, 60 to 36; Vote Reflects 
Concern over Detainee Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2005, at Al . 
126. See Jess Bravin, U.S. Revamps Policy on Torture Of War Prisoners, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
31, 2004, at Al (reporting the issuance of a new definition of what constitutes torture, "sharply 
scaling back its previous legal position that inflicting pain approaching that of organ failure or 
death was lawful, and retreating from earlier assertions that the president can authorize torture"); 
Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at Al 
(''The Justice Department has broadened its definition of torture, significantly retreating from a 
memorandum in August 2002 that defined torture extremely narrowly and said President Bush 
could ignore domestic and international prohibitions against torture in the name of national 
sxurity."). 
127. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to James C. Corney, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re: Legal 
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340--2340A, at 1 (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://justice.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. 
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interrogation policy and relaxing the prohibition against torture and cruel treatment of 
detainees. 128 The memos formed the basis of a growing list of questions by 
congressional staff. The memos also provided the substantive basis for a strategy of op-
eds, editorial board writings in the districts of key congressional members, and national 
media commentary. 129 Central to these efforts was a letter signed by twelve retired 
high-ranking military officers, including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General John Shalikashvili, urging Members of the Judiciary Committee to sharply 
question Gonzales about his role in shaping torture and interrogation 
policies. 130 According to military historian Richard H. Kohn, quoted in an article in the 
Washington Post, this action by a retired group of military officers was 
unprecedented. 131 Dozens of national media outlets, including virtually all mainstream 
press, covered the military letter. 132 Questioned in press briefings about the import of 
the letter, a White House spokesman engaged the debate: "We adhere to our laws and 
our treaty obligations. That's the policy of the United States government, and that's 
what we expect to be followed." 133 
It should be emphasized that any executive shift in response to the furor over the 
Gonzales nomination was limited; in the end, Gonzales was confirmed, having given 
the Senate committee only equivocal answers on some of the difficult questions of 
what interrogation methods the executive was prepared to allow. And while the White 
128. See ACLU, THE CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGl:ITS RECORD OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NOMINEE ALBERTO GoNZALES 2-5 (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
FilesPDFs/gonzalesreport.pdf; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF WHITE 
HousECOUNSELALBERTOGoNZALESTOBEATTORNEYGENERALOFTHEUNITEDSTATES2-3(Jan. 
2005), available at http://www.allianceforjustice.org/hot_topic/Gonzales0l05.pdf.; HUMAN 
RIGl:ITS FIRST, BACKGROUND PAPERS ON ALBERTO GoNZALES TORTURE, EXECUTIVE POWER, TI-IE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/briefs/brief_20041220_Gonz_all.pdf; 
PEOPLE R)R THE AMERICAN WAY, TORTURING THE TRUTH: MYTHS AND REALITY IN RIGHT WING 
ATTACKS ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/generaUdefault.aspx? 
old=l7725 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
129. See, e.g., Editorial, A Degrading Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2005, at A20; Bob 
Herbert, Op-Ed., Promoting Torture's Promoter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at A23; Editorial, 
Rewarding Mr. Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A22; Editorial, The Torture Memos, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2005, at A14. 
130. See Letter from Retired Military Leaders to Senate Judiciary Comm., (Jan. 4, 2005), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/statements/gonz_military 
_010405.pdf. 
131. Dan Eggen, Gonzales Nomination Draws Military Criticism; Retired Officers Cite His 
Role in Shaping Policies on Torture, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2005, at A2 ("'I don't know of any 
precedent for something like this . . . . A retired group of military officers bands together to 
virtually oppose a Cabinet nominee? And a non-military one? It is highly unusual, to say the 
least."' (quoting Richard H. Kohn)). 
132. See, e.g., id; Top Brass Wary of a Gonzales-led DOJ, UNITED PREss INT'L, Jan.4, 2005; 
Editorial, ls Gonzales Fit to be Attorney General?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 5, 2005 at 
AlO; James Rosen, Officers Object to Nominee; Bush's Pick Signed Torture Memos, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 5, 2005, at A3; Jerry Seper and Charles Hurt, Confirmation of 
Gonzales for Justice Expected, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A6. 
133. White House Press Briefing by Scott McClellan (Jan. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/0l/20050104-3.html#F. 
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House rescinded the 2002 OLC torture memo on the eve of Gonzales' confirmation 
hearings, it maintained vigorously through 2005 that existing legal bans on the use of 
"cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" (in particular, U.S. treaty obligations under 
the Convention Against Torture) do not apply outside the territory of the United States, 
and ( although there is no basis in the treaties or laws banning such treatment that would 
suggest one agency is at all distinct from the other in required compliance) the same 
laws that bind the U.S. Armed Forces do not equally bind the CIA. 134 
But there is little question that the executive was pressured to change its stated 
policy stance in response to public questions, and that actions were taken that likely 
would not have been without the orchestrated pressure. Perhaps most importantly, the 
lessons of the Gonzales nomination emboldened anti-coercion advocates. The incipient 
coalition of military leaders was developed over the succeeding months, and played a 
pivotal role in securing Senator McCain's public engagement on the question of 
torture, and the eventual overwhelming passage of McCain's amendment to ban cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment wherever U.S. officials operate.135 Civil society 
134. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Robin Wright, Cheney Fights for Detainee Policy: As Pressure 
Mounts to Limit Handling of Terror Suspects, He Holds Hard-Line, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, 
at Al ("Cheney ... made 'an impassioned plea' to reject McCain's amendment, said a senatorial 
aide who was briefed on the meeting . . .. Cheney said that aggressive interrogations of 
detainees such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed had yielded useful information, and that the option 
to treat prisoners harshly must not be taken from interrogators."); see also President's Statement 
on Signing ofH.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006," 41 WKLY. 
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news 
/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html (seeming to reserve authority to override just-passed ban on 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment based on constitutional power as Commander in Chief). 
135. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Publ. L. No. 109-148 § 1001, 119 Stat. 2739 
(McCain Amendment banning cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment); Charles Babington & 
Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation Limits, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2005, at Al 
(describing passage of McCain amendment by Senate vote of 90-9); Carl Hulse, Messy 
Congressional Finale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A24 (reporting final passage of McCain 
amendment). The coalition of military leaders who opposed Gonzales formed the core of a 
broader coalition of leaders who wrote a series of letters advocating for the McCain 
Amendment. See, e.g. , Letter from Gen. Joseph Hoar, USMC (Ret.) et al., to Senator John 
McCain, (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/pdf/mccain-
100305.pdf (urging passage oflaw to ban cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment). The support 
of retired military figured centrally in debates over the amendment, and Senator McCain relied 
on their engagement heavily in securing Republican support. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. SI 1061, 
Sll063 (2005) (statement of Sen. John McCain requesting that the letter from 29 retired 
military officers be printed in the Record); 151 CONG. REc. Sll077, Sll094 (2005) (McCain 
introduced a letter from Colin Powell to the record which read "I fully support this amendment. 
Further, I align myself with the letter written to you by General Shalikashivili and a 
distinguished group of senior officers in support of the amendment. ... Our troops need to hear 
from the Congress, which has an obligation to speak to such matters under Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution. I also believe the world will note that America is making a clear statement 
with respect to the expected future behavior of our soldiers. Such a reaction will help deal with 
the terrible public diplomacy crisis created by Abu Ghraib."); Jim Lobe, White House Losing 
Ground on Prisoner Treatment, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005, available at 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30528; Eric Schmitt, Senate Moves to Protect 
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played a forcing function in jumpstarting other structural mechanisms for change; 
without its engagement, it is unclear whether Congress or the Executive would to this 
day have taken action to address detainee torture or abuse. 
C. Activist Federal Courts 
The notion that the federal courts are countermajoritarian in nature-less 
democratic because judges are not elected or responsible to majority preferences-has 
long been part of constitutional debate. 136 Concerns about the propriety of judicial 
involvement have been particularly acute when it comes to matters of war, foreign 
affairs, national security, and intelligence-both because of judges' perceived distance 
from the political branches' decision making thought central to war and security policy, 
and because they are otherwise perceived as institutionally ill-suited to act. 137 Indeed, it 
Military Prisoners Despite Veto Threat, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2005 ('The measure ignited a fierce 
debate among many Senate Republicans and the White House .... Nonetheless, the measure 
passed, 90 to 9, with 46 Republicans, including Bill Frist of Tennessee, the majority leader, 
joining 43 Democrats and one independent in favor. More than two dozen retired senior military 
officers, including Colin L. Powell and John M. Shalikashvili, two former chainnen of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, endorsed the amendment."); Liz Sidoti, Senate to Engage in Debate over 
Detainees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 5, 2005 ("Eight Republicans support McCain's proposal and 
Democrats also are on board .... Since July, a list of retired generals and admirals backing the 
effort has doubled from 14 to 28."); Roxana Tiron, Rights Groups Tum Up Pressure for 
Prisoner Abuse Amendments, THE Hll.L, Oct. 4, 2005, available at http://www.thehill.com 
/thehi!Vexport/TheHill/Business/100405 .html. 
136. See Af.EXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLlTICS 16-17 (1962) ("[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a 
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the 
actual people .... "); see also, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 334 (1998) 
('The 'counterrnajoritarian difficulty' has been the central obsession of modern constitutional 
scholarship." ). For a recent summary of criticisms of the view of the Supreme Court as 
countermajoritarian, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative 
Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAw & INEQ. J. l, 12-32 (2005). 
137. On the institutional incompetence of the courts in security matters as compared to the 
political branches, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton); JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENT ARIES ON THE CONS1ITUTION OF THE UNITED STA TES § 768, at 546-47 (Ronald 
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) ("Of all the cases and concerns of government, the 
direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which distinguish the exercise of 
power by a single hand. Unity of plan, promptitude, activity, and decision, are indispensable to 
success; and these can scarcely exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively 
with the power."); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) ("In 
accordance with this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the 
political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign 
policy, national security, or military affairs." (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 296 F.3d 
278, 281) (internal quotation marks omitted)); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY (1973); Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Remarks to the American 
Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004 ), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/judge__gonzales.pdf (rejecting the suggestion that "our 
judges-even though untrained in executing war plans-have a substantive role in the war 
decisions of the Commander-in-Chief'). 
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is virtually impossible to find a discussion of executive military or national security 
powers in the classic treatises on constitutional law-and therefore in recent advocacy 
on behalf of the executive in "war on terror" cases-that does not begin by noting with 
acceptance or approval the "traditional reluctance of courts 'to intrude upon the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.'"138 While some 
advance this position as a matter of historical description, and others view it as a matter 
of normative propriety, the chorus of scholars insisting that national security requires 
judicial deference and expansive executive authority was so vigorous post-September 
11 as to create for a time what seemed to be a self-fulfilling prophecy of judicial 
disengagement with executive action. 139 
Despite the overwhelming weight of historical opinion and popular punditry that the 
courts are not well suited (because of competence or habit) to play an active role in 
138. Brief for the Petitioner at 44, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (quoting 
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,530 (1988)); see also, e.g.,EDWARDS.CORWIN, 
THE PRESIDENT: OfHCE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 236 (4th ed.1957) ("In short, it is the 
lesson of these cases that in the war crucible the more general principles of constitutional law 
and theory, those that ordinarily govern the delegation oflegislative power, the scope ofnational 
power over the ordinary life of the citizen, and the interpretation of the 'due process' clause as a 
restraint on substantive legislative power, become highly malleable, and that even the more 
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights take on an unaccustomed flexibility."); LoUIS HENKIN, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 53 (1996) ("[W]here security needs or emergency 
are claimed, the Court is likely to interpret the powers of the President generously and even to 
reduce the restrictions and safeguards of the Bill of Rights."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (3d ed. 2000) ([T]he President's "domestic executive authority is 
most expansive in time of war"). 
139. See, e.g., DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against 
Terrorism: Statement Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Administrative 
Oversight and the Courts, 106th Cong. (2001), (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor 
of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_ 
testimony.cfm?id=l29&wiUd=73 ("[C]ourts necessarily see but one case at a time and in 
wartime tend to defer to the executive's greater knowledge and expertise .... "); Robert H. 
Bork, Civil Liberties After 9/11, COMMENT., July-Aug. 2003, at 29-35; Ruth Wedgwood, The 
Rule of Law and the War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at A27; Joel B. Grossman, 
Careless With the Constitution? The Problem with Military Tribunals, FINDLAw' s WRIT, Nov. 
29, 2001, http://writ.news.findlaw. com/commentary/20011129_ grossman.html ("Rights are 
always at risk in wartime. Perhaps it is an exaggeration to claim that "inter arma silent leges" 
(during war law is silent), but in times of national emergency law often takes a back seat."); 
Sanford Levinson, What ls the Constitution's Role in Wartime?: Why Free Speech and Other 
Rights Are Not as Safe as You Might Think, FINDLAW's WRIT, Oct. 17, 2001, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011017 _levinson.htrnl ("Does law speak in time of 
war? And, if so, to whom, and how loudly? ... It is difficult to read our constitutional history, 
however, without believing that the Constitution is often reduced at best to a whisper during 
times of war."). Early court decisions following the September 11 attacks were replete with this 
view of the role of the courts. See, e.g., Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 296 F.3d 278,282 (4th Cir. 2002) 
("the President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the 
courts"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) ("In accordance with this 
constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches when 
called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or 
military affairs.") (quoting Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 296 F.3d 278,281 (2002)). 
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constraining executive power in times of emergency, the courts have turned out to be 
among the most effective actors in actually changing the course of executive policy 
since September 11. The Supreme Court's engagement in detention cases related to the 
"war on terror"--over vigorous executive branch objection140-is the most visible 
example. The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld-regarding the 
legality of indefinitely detaining a U.S. citizen captured on a battlefield in 
Afghanistan-led to the quickly negotiated release of a detainee the President had 
argued was a danger to the national security of the United States. 141 The Court's 
decision the same Term in Rasul v. Bush led hundreds of detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
to gain access to U.S. attomeys. 142 It was this newfound access that helped bring about 
the exposure of abusive practices at Guantanamo as the lawyers released the stories 
told by their clients, 143 about ongoing harsh conditions of detention, 144 and about the 
hunger strike a number of detainees were undertaking by the end of 2005. 145 And the 
Court's evident general willingness to engage the government on its assertions of 
power-regardless of the outcome in the particular case-had in itself an effect on the 
140. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (No. 03-Q696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/ 
docs/hamdi/hamdirumsl20303gopp.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
cert granted, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1027), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/rumspad l l 604certpet. pdf; Brief for the 
Respondents in Opposition, Rasul v. Bush, 321 F.3d 1134 (2003) (Nos. 03-334 and 03-343), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/gitmo_briefs/Brief_For_ 
Respondents_in_ Opposition. pdf. The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in 2005 in the case 
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, challenging the legality of military commission proceedings at 
Guantanamo Bay. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (order granting writ of 
certiorari). But see Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (No. 05-184) (urging Supreme Court to deny certiorari in part 
on grounds of risk of interfering with military exigency). 
141. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). After being held for three years without 
charge, Yaser Hamdi was released on October 11, 2004 and deported to Saudi Arabia. See U.S.-
Freed 'Combatant' ls Returned to Saudi Arabia, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at AS. 
142. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Emily Heller, A Different Take on Detainees 
Scores Big, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 3, 2005, at 13; Deroy Murdock, Gitmo Legal, NAT'LREV., Dec. 5, 
2005, at 28. 
143. See, e.g., CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND 
GUANTANAMO BAY: STATEMENT OF SHAFIQ RAsUL, AslF IQBAL AND RHl.JHEL AHMED, 
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_l l th/docs/Guantanamo_composite_statement_ 
FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2006); see also DAVID ROSE, GUANTANAMO: THE WAR ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2004 ); Neil A. Lewis, In Rising Numbers, Lawyers Head for Guantanamo Bay, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at AIO; All Things Considered: Guantanamo Detainees Freed in 
Britain (National Public Radio March 11, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story. php ?story Id= 1761236. 
144. Brief for Human Rights First as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (petition for cert. granted Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184), 2005 WL 
2178808 (describing effects of prolonged solitary confinement and other harsh conditions of 
detention). 
145. See Neil A. Lewis, Widespread Hunger Strike at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2005, at A24. 
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day-to-day conduct of detainee operations that, without Court involvement, would not 
have come to be. 146 
The Supreme Court has hardly been alone in active engagement since September 
11; federal district courts from South Carolina to New York City have at times rejected 
executive practice in vigorous terms. 147 Perhaps as significantly, they have on occasion 
issued direct orders mandating specific action in ongoing detention operations. In one 
of the more dramatic examples of the effective power of the courts to stay the hand of 
the executive, federal district court Judge James Robertson ruled in November 2004 
that the military commission trials at Guantanamo Bay were inconsistent with U.S. 
treaty obligations; within minutes of the court's order, an aide handed the presiding 
military commissioner a slip of paper, and commission proceedings then underway at 
Guantanamo were called to an immediate and indefinite halt. 148 At the same time, the 
district court issued an injunctive order compelling the Defense Department to keep 
commission defendant Salim Ahmed Hamdan out of solitary confinement (where he 
had been for close to a year, and according to his attorneys, had begun suffering 
significant adverse psychiatric consequences) and to return him to the general 
Guantanamo population. 149 The court reinforced that order at the end of 2005 when it 
146. Following the Supreme Court's decision to hear the cases of Jose Padilla and Yaser 
Hamdi, both of whom had been held in detention for nearly two years, both men were for the 
first time granted a visit with their lawyers. See Jerry Markon, Terror Suspect, Attorneys Meet 
for 1st Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2004, at B3; Stevenson Swanson, Padilla Gets to Talk with 
His Lawyers, Cm. TRrn., Mar. 4, 2004, at Al. Soon after the Supreme Court ' s rulings inHamdi 
and Rasul, the Department of Defense announced the formation of Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals for detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, which gives detainees the ability to contest 
their status as enemy combatants. See U.S . Department of Defense News Release, Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal Order Issued (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink. 
mil/releases/2004/nr20040707-0992.html. 
147. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005) (ordering the 
Commander of the U.S. Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina to release Padilla from his 
custody within 45 days of the order), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005); In re Guantanamo 
Bay Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,481 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding detainees had stated both 
constitutional and treaty law claims); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 
2004) (ordering suspension of military commission proceedings at the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 
(2005). But see, e.g., Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding "no 
viable legal theory exists" by which the court could grant writ of habeas corpus to Guantanamo 
Bay detainees). "The President's ability to make the decisions necessary to prosecute a 
Congressionally authorized armed conflict must be interpreted expansively." Id. at 318. For a 
summary of other post-September 11 cases addressing various constitutional challenges to 
executive action, see Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: 
Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRAL. REv. 795, 816-41 (2004) ("To their 
credit, the trial courts have not routinely deferred to the administration's policies in this most 
recent war. Many courts have held that the administration' s actions do not pass constitutional 
muster, and those that have held otherwise have subjected those actions to serious constitutional 
scrutiny."). 
148. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173; see also Avi Cover, Human Rights First, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, Military Commission Trial Observation (Nov. 8, 2004), http://www. 
humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/detainees/military_commission_diary.htm#day2. 
149. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 174 ("FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner be released 
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appeared Hamdan's location had been changed again;150 the government promptly 
complied. 151 A similar, albeit limited, directive was issued in response to attorney 
complaints about the treatment of hunger-striking detainees at Guantanamo. 152 
Perhaps the most significant court action bearing directly on the question of torture 
and interrogation to date was the ruling of a New York federal district court in 
litigation brought under the Freedom oflnforrnation Act (FOIA) seeking the release of 
thousands of pages of official documents bearing on U.S. interrogation policy and 
practice, as well as the official response to prisoner mistreatment. 153 Despite the 
executive' s vigorous objection to the release of the requested documents,154 the slow 
and steady release of documents that followed the district court's order helped to 
prompt an additional high-profile military investigation into accusations of abuse, 155 
from the pre-Commission detention wing of Camp Delta and returned to the general population 
of Guantanamo detainees, unless some reason other than the pending charges against him 
requires different treatment."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights First, et al. in 
Support of Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 1019 (2004) (No. 04-702), (describing 
effects of prolonged solitary confinement and other harsh conditions of detention). 
150. See Emergency Motion to Compel and for Writ in Aid of Jurisdiction at 2, Hamdan, 
344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (No. 1:04-CV-01519). 
151. Minute Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel and for Writ in Aid of 
Jurisdiction, Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152; see also Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration 
vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 8, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 86-88 ("When his lawyers 
learned about [Hamdan' s relocation at Guantanamo] in early December, they were not pleased. 
Not only had Hamdan's relocation violated the explicit order of a federal judge that he be kept 
among the general population at Delta, but he also would be right next to Ali Hamza Ahmed 
Sulayman al-Bahlul, a supposed Qaeda propagandist with a reputation for turning other 
detainees against their U.S. attorneys .... [Hamdan's attorneys] promptly filed an emergency 
motion to have their client returned to a normal cellblock, and the authorities at Guantanamo 
complied."). 
152. See AI-Joudi v. Bush, 406 F. Supp. 2d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering the government 
to "provide notice to Petitioners' counsel within 24 hours of the commencement of any forced 
feeding of their clients," and for those who are force fed, the provision to counsel of "medical 
records spanning the period beginning one week prior to the date forced feeding commenced ... 
at a minimum, on a weekly basis until forced feeding concludes"). 
153. Stipulation and Order, ACLU v. Dep' t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(No. 04 Civ. 4151), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments 
/eeOrderforResponsivedocs.pdf. 
154. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d 547 (No. 04 Civ. 4151), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/wCIAOppBrief030305. pelf. 
155. See FBI Documents, ACLU FOIA Litigation (Dec. 20, 2004), 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/122004.html (including FBI memos-the first such 
accounts from government officials--describing Guantanamo detainees in frigid temperatures 
left chained to the floor, lying in their own excrement, and in one case pulling his own hair out 
in response); SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 14, at 2 ("In response to FBI agent allegations of 
aggressive interrogation techniques at Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) Cuba, 
that were disclosed in Dec 04 as a result of FOIA releases, General (GEN) Bantz J. Craddock, 
Commander United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), ordered an AR 15-6 
investigation and appointed Brigadier General (BG) John T. Furlow, United States Army South 
Deputy Commander for Support, as the investigating officer.") (ordering investigation into use 
of dogs, sleep deprivation, temperature extremes, and other coercive interrogation techniques). 
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and helped ensure the sustained focus on the treatment of prisoners that civil society 
organizations relied on in their advocacy work. 156 
As with the professional military and civil society, the federal courts have been far 
from uniform in their response to executive detention and interrogation policy; they 
have ruled for the executive as well as against. 157 Likewise, the government's response 
has, despite a series of adverse rulings, seemed at times startlingly intransigent in 
failing to recognize the constraints judicial decisions appeared to place squarely on its 
conduct. While the Supreme Court in 2004 deferred deciding the merits of the case of 
Jose Padilla (the U.S. citizen "enemy combatant" arrested at Chicago's O'Hare 
Airport), the Court's 8-1 ruling in the parallel case of U.S. citizen "enemy combatant" 
Yaser Hamdi (picked up in Afghanistan) rejected the President's broadest assertion of 
executive power-to hold U.S. citizens indefinitely as "enemy combatants" with no set 
process for resolving their status-and should have put the executive on notice that its 
existing strategy in Padilla's case was untenable. Yet it was not until November 
2005-nearly a year and a half after the Court's Hamdi decision, and more than three 
years since Padilla's initial arrest-that the government finally indicted Padilla on 
criminal charges. And even then, the government has refused to renounce the power to 
designate Padilla himself-or any other U.S. citizen the President might choose-an 
"enemy combatant" again. 158 Finally, it is important to note that many of the most 
Among the Schmidt Report's recommendations is "a policy-level review and determination of 
the status and treatment of all detainees, when not classified as EPW s [ enemy prisoners of war]. 
This review needs to particularly focus on the definitions of humane treatment, military 
necessity, and proper employment of interrogation techniques." Id. at 28. 
156. See supra Part III.B. 
157. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 
F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 
450,463 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2003); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
158. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellant at 11, Padilla, 432 F.3d 582 (No. 05-6396), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padhnftl 20905sb4th.pdf (noting that 
"the President could redesignate [Padilla] for detention as an enemy combatant"); President's 
Order to Secretary of Defense Transferring Detainee to Control of Attorney General (Nov. 20, 
2005), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/gwbl 12005memo.htrnl (declining to revoke 
Padilla's designation as an "enemy combatant"); see also Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen., 
Justice Department News Briefing on the Indictment of Jose Padilla (Nov. 22, 2005), available 
at 2005 WL 3113525 (declining to comment on executive's continuing power to detain 
indefinitely designated "enemy combatants," and commenting "[t]he Fourth Circuit has held 
that the President of the United States was authorized to detain Mr. Padilla as an enemy 
combatant. And so I would just leave it at that."); Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Case Not 
Closed, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/%2010184957/ (quoting Justice 
Department spokesperson refusing to answer whether Padilla would be freed if acquitted of 
criminal charges or detained further as "enemy combatant"). It should be noted the 
Government's indictment of Padilla came only after Padilla filed a new petition for writ of 
certiorari, meaning the case was again poised for Supreme Court review. The Fourth Circuit 
denied the government's transfer motion, suggesting that the government was trying to avoid 
Supreme Court review. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that the 
government's motion "appeared to be an attempt to avoid consideration of the issues by the 
Supreme Court"). The Supreme Court reversed, granting the government's transfer request in 
January 2006. Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006). 
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important questions of executive power to engage in coercive interrogation have yet to 
come before the courts in the post-September 11 era. 159 
Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
judiciary as a constraint on executive power in the "war on terror." Most significantly, 
the federal courts have not been shy about taking on questions of executive conduct 
bearing on individual rights (related to arbitrary detention, fair trial, secrecy, and 
prisoner treatment), often ruling against executive demands. In doing so, the courts 
have not much troubled themselves with historical warnings about their supposed 
limited competence in these delicate areas of national security. 160 Neither has there 
been a predictably partisan pattern to judicial decisionrnaking for or against the 
executive; right-leaning judges have vigorously rejected the Republican President's 
claims, 161 and left-leaning judges have at times afforded the executive substantial 
discretion to proceed largely as he would. 162 Rather, in largely measured decisions, 163 
the courts have forced, if not bigger-picture policy shifts, then at least case-specific 
limits on policy judgments, and marginal (or better) improvements in the handling of 
day-to-day detention operations. 164 
In the end, it may be time to rethink the longstanding historical prejudice against 
judicial engagement in matters of national security. The courts have for the most part 
159. See, e.g., Consolidated Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, Ali v. 
Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-1378 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06l05-etn-rums-complaint.pdf; Ibrahim v. Titan, 391 F. 
Supp. 2d l O (D.D.C. 2005) (considering liability of private government contractors for alleged 
torture). 
160. Indeed, the only occasion on which a justice of the Supreme Court has quoted the 
famous passage from Hamilton's Federalist No. 70 about the institutional competence of the 
courts in matters of national security is in Justice Thomas's dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507,581 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ('The Founders intended that the President have 
primary responsibility-along with the necessary power-to protect the national security and to 
conduct the Nation's foreign relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages 
of a unitary Executive are essential in these domains.") (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton)). Justice Thomas was the sole justice to find that the President had 
inherent authority not only to detain Hamdi but also to make "virtually conclusive factual 
findings" unchecked by the courts. Id. at 589. 
161. See, e.g. , Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Padilla, 432 F.3d at 583; 
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F.Supp.2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005) 
162. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by, inter 
alios, Breyer, J.); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We agree that great 
deference is afforded the President's exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief. We also 
agree that whether a state of armed conflict exists against an enemy to which the laws of war 
apply is a political question for the President, not the courts. Because we have no authority to do 
so, we do not address the government's underlying assumption that an undeclared war exists 
between al Qaeda and the United States.") (citations omitted). 
163. Even the most aggressive judicial decisions against the government have left open 
options for how an illegally held detainee may be handled going forward. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92. The Supreme Court's 
decisions broadly against the executive likewise left ample room for the executive to decide how 
best to proceed, within certain parameters set down by the justices. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-
34 (O'Connor, J.); Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
164. See supra Part III.C. 
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seemed no more troubled by complex questions of national security presented by many 
of these cases than they have been by the complexities of copyright, antitrust, or 
ERISA legislation. And while judges are indeed unelected, and in that sense 
undeniably "countermajoritarian," they stood essentially alone among the branches for 
four years in suggesting that the executive's power in our constitutional democracy was 
not unlimited. In identifying ways to enhance protections against torture or other 
coercive interrogation, measures that ensure judicial enforceability and strengthen 
judicial independence appear essential. 
CONCLUSION 
The government's response to the "war on terror" has taught us a great deal about 
democracy and the rule of law in the United States. Among other things, this Article 
suggests that the mechanisms described above may not fully deserve the anti-
democratic criticisms that they have all, at various times, endured. If an effectively 
constrained executive is to remain a key measure of democratic vigor, 165 then pro-
democracy advocates in the United States should consider steps to enhance the 
checking effects of these institutions. 
Thus, for example, rather than shying away from a highly trained and 
professionalized military, we should consider exploring ways to enhance internal 
military monitoring-an examination of the need for professional training and ethics 
requirements, an expanded role for the JAG corps in monitoring and reporting on 
interrogation operations, mandatory command accountability, or automatic triggers for 
third-party investigations (including access to classified materials) following evidence 
of military and intelligence community wrongdoing. 166 Rather than questioning the 
competence of the courts to opine on matters of national security and military affairs, 
we should strive to ensure that affirmative protections for rights in law (under the 
Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States) include or are interpreted to 
include vigorous and ready enforcement mechanisms that centrally engage the courts. 
Above all, we should strive to keep these remaining "independent" actors 
independent from principal executive decision makers. The checks and balances 
written into the Constitution alone are not adequate to constrain an overly aggressive 
executive. But constitutional checks in combination with institutions driven by less 
classically democratic incentives and accountability structures-these leave ample 
room for believing that it is possible to constrain even the wartime executive. 
165. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 99, at 121-31 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). 
166. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (regarding absence of oversight and training 
functions as partial cause of widespread torture and abuse). 
